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Abstract 
Socratic Influence on the Stoic Epictetus 
Brandon Mulvey 
The primary aim of this proj ect is to examine the nature of Socrates' influence on the 
Stoic Epictetus. While Plato's Socrates certainly influenced Epictetus, the Socrates portrayed in 
Xenophon's Memorabilia plays an even larger role in shaping the Socrates Epictetus seeks to 
imitate. This claim will be substantiated by drawing close parallels between passages in 
Epictetus' Discourses and Handbook and Xenophon's Memorabilia. The discussion here 
demonstrates that Epictetus' methodology is a reflection ofXenophon's approach, characterized 
by committed doctrines and proscriptive advice giving, rather than the searching dialectical 
approach ending with negative results found in Plato's Socratic dialogues. I begin by examining 
A.A. Long's claim that it is Plato's Socrates that Epictetus emulates, and providing a critical 
analysis ofthis argument. I then argue that the methodology of Epicetetus' Discourses, as well as 
the content and subject matter, are inspired by Xenophon's Socrates. 
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Introduction 
The primary aim of this project is to elucidate the nature of Socrates' influence on 
the Stoic Epictetus. The claim will be advanced that, while the Socrates of early Platonic 
dialogues had a significant influence on Epictetus' unique contributions to Stoic 
philosophy, the Socrates portrayed in Xenophon's Memorabilia plays an even larger role 
in shaping the Socrates Epictetus seeks to imitate both in his method and in the focus of 
his work. This claim will be substantiated by drawing close parallels between passages in 
Epictetus' Discourses and Handbook and Xenophon's Memorabilia. The discussion here 
seeks to demonstrate that Epictetus' methodology is a reflection ofXenophon's approach, 
which is characterized by committed doctrines and proscriptive advice giving, rather than 
the searching dialectical approach ending with negative results found in Plato's Socratic 
dialogues. 
I begin by examining A.A. Long's claim that it is the Socrates of Plato's 
dialogues that Epictetus emulates, and providing a critical analysis of this argument!. I 
then tum to making the case that Xenophon's Socrates strongly influences Epictetus. 
First, I argue that, methodologically, Epictetus imitates Socrates as presented by 
Xenophon in particular through portraying Socrates as a guide who offers proscriptive 
insight into the nature of knowledge. Then I demonstrate that the content and subject 
matter, in addition to the methodology, of Epictetus' Discourses also strongly reflects 
that found in Xenophon. The claim is bolstered by examining the material dedicated to 
training, self-improvement, and humble approaches to living featured in Xenophon's 
Socratic works and the Discourses. The aim is to show the two bear such similarity that 
1 This argument is found in Chapter 3 of Long's Epictetus (Oxford, 2002), entitled "The Socratic 
Paradigm". 
------------------------
Xenophon's picture of Socrates is quite likely the main influence on Epictetus. Thus, I 
propose that, contrary to the accepted view of Epictetus' influences, Epictetus' body of 
work must be reconsidered in light ofXenophon's' work. 
5 
As a precautionary measure, I must stress that attempting to demonstrate 
irrefutable evidence that Epicetus has been absolutely and unquestionably influenced 
directly by either Plato's Socrates or Xenophon's Socrates is an insurmountable task. The 
reason for this is that Epictetus' contributions to philosophy are the product of influence 
of all of his predecessors to some degree or another. Both Long and I agree that the 
uniqueness of Epictetus' approach is that it is Socratic; the disagreement on my part is 
that Long argues the Socrates Epictetus has in mind is the one presented by Plato, 
whereas I feel Epictetus' Socrates is a composite of both Plato's and Xenophon's and, as 
I argue, more of the latter than the former. Some thematic parallels I draw in attempting 
to establish this might be labeled as common Stoic property in the realm of ideas, 
however, I would argue that the origin of these ideas still goes back to the Socrates 
presented by Plato and Xenophon. Again, an attempt to establish this beyond question 
would be impossible; direct evidence of Epictetus' Stoic predecessors is too fragmentary 
to make a compelling argument. Instead, I wish to show that, placed side by side, the 
influence of Socrates on Epictetus shines through, even if it was passed down through 
other sources. Thus the two sources I find most relevant, and the only two concerns over 
time and space allow me to consider here, are precisely Plato and Xenophon. 
Long begins his argument by making the uncontroversial claim that Socrates is 
the primary influence on Epictetus' philosophy, and argues that this influence is clear 
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because of Epictetus' methodology, and attention to self-examination2. Within this 
paper, the term "methodology" will be used to refer to the means by which knowledge is 
imparted by a particular author to the audience. It is the source of Epictetus' 
methodology, and the nature of it, that, I contend, should be controversial. Long claims 
that both Epictetus' and Socrates' methodology consists of dialectic: "the great interest 
and distinctiveness of ... Epictetus' dependence and reflection on Socrates, consist in the 
way the discourses appropriate and adapt Socratic dialectic; by which I mean the 
conversation Socrates practices in Plato's dialogues, including interpersonal discussion 
by question and answer, exposure of ignorance and inconsistency by means of the 
elenchus, and irony,,3. I aim to dispute this claim, but first the case he makes for the 
above assertion must be examined. 
While I do not disagree with Long that Epictetus is not interested in Plato's own 
philosophy but instead sees him as a reliable source, reporting on the philosophy of 
Socrates himself, I propose that his further claim that Plato's works are, "the richest 
source on Socrates' life, thought and conversation" is certainly a debatable point4. There 
is no absolute consensus among modem scholars concerning whether the Socrates of 
Plato's early dialogues represents an accurate portrayal of the real Socrates' "life, 
thought, and conversation," rather than a character by which Plato presents his own 
philosophical explorations. I argue that Xenophon is an important reporter of the 
2 "it is Socrates who primarily authorizes everything Epictetus is trying to give his students in terms of 
philosophical methodology, self-examination, and a life model for them to imitate" 66 
3 68 
469 
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historical Socrates and that some features of his Socrates survive and are represented, 
hundreds of years later, in the writing of Epictetus5• 
Dorion traces the history of the dismissal of Xenophon to an origin in the work of 
Sch1eiemarcher. Sch1eiemarcher describes a method for discerning the true Socrates by 
stating: "the only safe method (Der einzige sichere Weg) seems to be, to inquire: what 
may Socrates have been, over and above what Xenophon has described, without however 
contradicting the strokes of character (Charakterzugen), and the practical maxims 
(Lebensmaximen), which Xenophon distinctly delivers as those of Socrates: and what 
must he have been, to give Plato a right, and an inducement, to exhibit him as he has 
done in his dialogues? (1879: 14 = 1818: 59)". Dorion retorts: "This "method" raises 
more problems than it can possibly hope to resolve. As far as the "practical maxims" or 
the "rules of life" (Lebensmaximen) are concerned, a single example will suffice to 
illustrate the pitfalls ... of Sch1eiermacher's ... method. Book IV, Chapter 5 of the 
Memorabilia is devoted to the way in which Socrates assisted his companions in 
regulating their behavior. . .it appears [here] that self-mastery (enkrateia) is the surest 
foundation for behavior and action. If self-mastery is the sine qua non condition for all 
successful practical activity, it is hardly surprising that Xenophon affirms that enkrateia 
is the foundation of virtue (Memorabilia 1.5.4). Must we consider, then, that the 
principal role attributed to enkrateia has the value of a "practical maxim"? If so, 
Xenophon's account would have precedence over Plato's ... .In fact, since Plato's Socrates 
grants no theoretical importance to enkrateia - the term enkrateia is not found in Plato's 
first dialogues, ... and because he attributes to knowledge the role that Xenophon 
5 For more on this topic, see Dorion 2010. 
---------------------------
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attributes to enkrateia, his position appears irreconcilable with a practical maXIm 
defended by Xenophon's Socrates and must, in accordance with Schleierrnacher's 
method, be sacrificed. As can be seen, this "method" leads to results that are at times 
contrary .... The difficulties raised by this method notwithstanding, it did exert exceptional 
programmatic influence. 6" 
Regarding Plato scholars, he states that Schleierrnacher's example "points out the 
dissension even among Plato scholars: The case of Plato's account especially highlights 
the absence of consensus; if we consider only those commentators who are inclined to 
grant priority to Plato's dialogues, we notice that they do not tum to the same dialogues 
to reconstruct the historical Socrates' theories. Some rely mostly on the Apology, many 
base their work on the entirety of the early dialogues 7, or on just a few of them, others 
still call on the apocryphal dialogues8, and finally some consider that every word that 
Plato put in Socrates' mouth, whether in an early, middle, or late dialogue, has a place in 
the record of the historical Socrates9• It is quite surprising that there is no consensus 
regarding the number and identity of Plato's dialogues that would allow for the 
reconstruction of the historical Socrates' ideas, but, in another way, this disagreement 
among interpreters is inevitable because of the doctrinal heterogeneity of Socrates' 
character in the corpus platonicum 10". I will expand upon this counter-claim below, after 
first de constructing the argument of A.A. Long. 
6 See the numerous references given by Dorion 2000, p. XIII n.2. 
7 See Maier 1913; Guthrie 1975, p. 67; Vlastos 1991, pp. 45-50; Graham 1992; Brickhouse & Smith 2000, 
pp. 44-49; 2003,pp. 112-113. 
8 See Tarrant 1938. 
9 This is the position defended by Taylor (1911, p. IX) and Burnet (1911; 1914). 
10 Montuori (1981, p. 225): "It is important to underline that Plato does not give us a single image of 
Socrates, coherent and complete, but a disconcerting plurality of images, all of which have been noted by 
the critics, who in tum have taken one or the other as the most faithful description of the historical person 
ofSophroniscus'son." See also p. 226. 
9 
The "Socratic Paradigm", Long's chapter outlining his claims regarding the 
relationship between the Platonic Socrates and Epictetus' Socrates, includes a number of 
claims which are potentially problematic. First, Long argues that Socrates' portrayal in 
Epictetus' writing as a figure who relies upon reason in all elements of his life. However, 
a quote from the Memorabilia, Xenophon's principal text, placed parallel to Long's 
quotes shows that characterizing Socrates as one who lived by reason alone is not unique 
to Plato. Quote 18 in Long's text is drawn from Epictetus' Manual: "Socrates fulfilled 
himself by attending to nothing except reason in everything he encountered ... "ll. 
Xenophon, however also portrays a striking similar vision of Socrates: "musn't it be 
reasonable to describe me as wise, seeing that, ever since I began to understand speech, I 
have never stopped investigating and learning any good thing that I could"l2. 
Additionally, Long argues that the positioning of these quotes at the end of the Manual 
by Arrian "reflect[s] Epictetus' priorities". This claim does not appear to make a great 
deal of sense; one must remember that the actual author of the Manual is Arrian, 
producing a summary of his own longer recordings of Epictetus' teaching in the 
Discourses. 
Leaping to conclusions about Epictetus' priorities is inappropriate, as Arrian is 
simply summarizing, and no hierarchical ordering of priorities on Epictetus' part can be 
inferred from the positioning chosen by another. Though some may argue that Long's 
portrayal of Epictetus as drawing explicitly from Plato due to his interpretation of 
Socrates as reliant upon reason, this argument is neither precise nor watertight. This is 
because Xenophon, who was writing at roughly the same time as Plato, also forwards the 
II Long 69 
12 Xen. Apol. 45 
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same portrayal of Socrates. Long's framing of these passages as reflecting Epictetus' 
priorities is largely meaningless since Epictetus' own priorities cannot be discerned 
accurately from Arrian's writings. He simply did not order Epictetus' arguments in a 
systematic manner. 
A similar issue to the one presented above is found in Long's critique of 
Epictetus' presentation of one of the most famous doctrines attributable to Socrates. 
Epictetus writes that, "in the case of theory it is easy to examine and refute an ignorant 
person, but in the business of life no one submits to such testing and we hate the one who 
puts us through it .... But Socrates used to say that an unexamined life is not worth 
living 13. Long argues that this is drawn from "one of the most memorable of Socrates' 
concluding sentences from the Apology" 14. This has a close parallel in Xenophon's own 
Apology, where he presents Socrates as saying "musn't it be reasonable to describe me as 
wise, seeing that, ever since I began to understand speech, I have never stopped 
investigating and learning any good thing I could,,15. Here Xenophon is emphasizing that 
Socrates is defending his life as an examined life l6 . Thus again we are presented with a 
case where what Long presents as unique to Plato's Socrates is present in Xenophon as 
well, and the inspiration for Epictetus could have been drawn equally from either, or 
more likely, both. 
In addition to these passages, Long supports his central claim in Chapter 3 that the 
Socratic dialectic found in Plato is closely emulated by Epictetus through the use of a 
series of passages in Epictetus' writing which he sees as parallel to Plato's writings. He 
\3 Disc. 1.26.17-18 - as Long points out reiterated again at 3.12.15 
14 Long 70 
15 Apol. 12-20 p. 45 
16 demonstrated by his disdain for akrasia, in tune with necessities of his life- that others come to learn from 
him if they make virtue their goal etc 
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presents seven propositions from Plato's Gorgias and provides what he asserts are 
parallel and nearly identical passages in Epictetus' Discourses. This is problematic, in 
the first place, because Long neglects to complete a detailed analysis of why he believes 
the passages to be such close parallels. Additionally, he presents these propositions as 
irrefutable proof that the source for Epictetus' writings is Plato alone. However, my aim 
will be to more closely analyze the passages Long chose as well as to provide parallels in 
Xenophon that are equally likely or even more likely to have inspired Epictetus. 
Although it is certainly possible that Epictetus does at some point rely solely on Plato's 
dialogues as his inspiration, I do not find this to be the case for any of Long's seven 
propositions. 
[A.] Nothing is worse than false beliefs about goodness and justice. (458a; Epictetus 
1.11.11) 
The first proposition forwarded by Long surrounds the concept of false beliefs. 
Long argues that Epictetus is drawing directly upon Plato and is emulating Socrates when 
he writes: 
ayvotTv wxov ou f.lEyUAll Sllf.lia, TO OE TWV aya8wv Kai TWV KaKWv Kai TWV KaTa 
<pUOW Kai napa <pUOW T41 
"And yet, to be ignorant of the criterion for colours, or smells, or tastes, might 
perhaps be no very great loss. But do you think he suffers only a small loss who is 
17 Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae. Epictetus. Heinrich Schenk!. editor. Leipzig. B. G. Teubner. 
1916. 
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ignorant of what is good and evil, and natural and unnatural, to man? No the very 
greatest" 18 
To support his position, Long cites Plato's Gorgias: 
[458u] tyw oUv, ei ~Ev Kui O"U eT TWV av9pomwv iilV1tep Kui tyro, ~8EW<; ov O"e 
OAAOV a1tUAAa~Ut. OU8EV yap oT~ut TOO"OOTOV KUKOV eTVUt av9pro1tCj), OO"OV 86~u 
"What kind of man am I? One of those who would be pleased to be refuted if I 
say something untrue, and pleased to refute if someone else does, yet not at all 
less pleased to be refuted than to refute. For I think that being refuted is a greater 
good, in so far as it is a greater good for a man to get rid of the greatest badness 
himself than to rid someone else of it; for I think there is no badness for a man as 
great as a false belief about the things which our discussion is about now" 19. 
While these passages share some similarities, they are not, in fact, precisely 
parallel. Specifically, Plato's quote incorporates the notion of "false beliefs" explicitly, 
while Epictetus focuses more broadly on ignorance, which mayor may not actually 
incorporate a false belief or, may rather, simply be a lack of knowledge, holding no belief 
one way or the other about a topic. Long assumes that Epictetus drew solely on Plato, 
however in Xenophon's Memorabilia is present what is, I assert, an even more exact 
parallel to Epictetus's writings. 
18 Disc. 1.11.11 
19 458a - Long's translation p. 71-2 
13 
First, Xenophon presents Socrates as saying: "Don't you think that self-
indulgence debars people from wisdom, which is the greatest good, and drives them into 
the opposite state?" 20. Xenophon's use of the term "wisdom" is more directly related to 
Epictetus' use of the term ignorance than Plato's more limited reference to false beliefs; 
ignorance is lack of any wisdom of the good, a negation of the greatest good being the 
greatest harm. Xenophon continues, writing: "Don't you think that, by dragging them off 
in pursuit of pleasure, it prevents them from studying and apprehending their real 
interests; and that it often confuses their perception of good and bad and makes them 
choose the worse instead of the better?,,21 Xenophon's referencing the confusion 
between good and bad reflects quite closely Epictetus' concept of ignorance of good and 
evil. Thus, while Long frames his argument regarding this portion of Epictetus' writing 
as focusing on false beliefs, this may be a misinterpretation. In fact, it appears that 
Epictetus may have, additionally, drawn upon Xenophon, who presents a picture of the 
dangers of self-indulgence to wisdom when he states "when you are struck by the 
impression of some pleasure, guard yourself, as with impressions generally, against being 
carried away by it,,22. 
The points made here is that the false belief that doing what "one sees fit" (from 
Plato below) or to put it more plainly, self-indulging, is the worst thing one can do; this 
also means one must have false beliefs about what is good because indulgence drags one 
away from one's true interests. 
20 4 .5.8 
21 4.5.8 
22 Handbook 34 
14 
Now let us more closely examine the original Greek in the two passages, in order 
to determine whether Epictetus may have been guided by the terminology and manner of 
expression Plato's Socrates actually uses. 
The key passage from the Gorgias is as follows: 
ouM:v yap oTl-un 'tocroU'tOv KaKOv ETvat av8pamqJ, Ocrov 86~a23 
The entirey of the Epictetus passage is relevant here, and bears repeating: 
, 'l' 
J..lEv oUV 
A cursory glance might lead one to think the subject matter here is largely the 
same, however in the Gorgias quote it is false 86~a, or opinion, that is considered by 
Plato's Socrates to be the source of greatest harm. In other words, treating false beliefs as 
knowledge is most harmful. The harm in the Epictetus quote is not having a KpmlPwv 
(criterion) of knowledge. He first asserts that lacking a criterion of trivial sensibles is 
perchance not a great harm, roxOv ou J..lEyuA:rl Sl1J..lia, and then continues on to ask "and of 
the good and the of the bad etc ... ". The implication here and the use of the genitive 
indicates he must be implying lacking the criterion of these is the source of harm that his 
conversant affirms is the greatest. The crucial difference here is this focus on a criterion. 
For Epictetus this is something one can come to possess, something that Plato's Socrates 
never arrives at in any of the early dialogues. Thus one can see why the Academic 
skeptics took to heart the message and the stance that the greatest harm one can suffer is 
23 Plato. Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet. Oxford University Press. 1903. Gorgias 458a6 
15 
to falsely treat something as knowledge, whereas for Epictetus and other Stoics the 
greatest harm is not firmly grasping the criterion which allows one to make judgments 
and possess knowledge. Possessing this KPlTTJptoV, of the good and the bad, 'rCDv ayu8wv 
Kul rwv KUKWV, and what is according to nature, Kura <pUOlV, is a real possibility both for 
Xenophon's Socrates and for Epictetus. The different terms used in the passages lends 
further reason to think that the overall message is also different. If Epictetus was truly 
following the lead of Plato's Socrates, introducing criterion as a key term and using the 
infinitive aYV081V to state what one does, while nowhere mentioning 86~u, makes little 
sense. We should not always expect a philosopher working hundreds of years beyond his 
sources to exactly paraphrase his influences, however, I would argue that Epictetus' 
terminology as a distinct departure with an implied telos being advocated, namely, 
obtaining the elusive and necessary criterion. 
[B.] It is worse to do wrong than to suffer wrong. (474c ff.; Epictetus 4.1.122-3) 
Long furthers his argument that Epictetus drew solely on Plato when citing 
passages about Socrates' teachings on suffering wrong. The passage in question from 
Epictetus is as follows: "So also with man .... What then is his nature? To bite and kick 
and throw people into prison and behead them? No; but to do good, to cooperate with 
others, and to pray for their good. 'Did not Socrates, then, fare badly? No; but his judges 
and accusers" 24 The wording Long draws on from Plato is: "Socrates: " ... which do you 
think is more shameful, doing what's unjust or suffering it? Tell me. Polus: Doing it. 
Socrates: Now if doing it is in fact more shameful, isn't it also worse? Polus: No, not in 
24 4 , Ll22-3, 
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the least. Socrates: I see. Evidently you don't believe that admirable and good are the 
same, or that bad and shameful are" 25. While this passage does bear some similarity to 
Epictetus' passage, Plato is not the only source presenting a Socrates who would rather 
suffer than do wrong. In fact, Xenophon begins his Apology by relating a discourse 
between Socrates and Hermogenes on the subject of preparing a defense. Hermogenes 
rebukes Socrates for not having done so. Socrates replies that the entirety of his life has, 
in fact, been a defense. When Hermogenes asks how this could be so, Socrates replies, 
"because I have consistently done no wrong, and this, I think, is the finest preparation for 
a defense,,26. He continues by emphasizing he has lived the best kind oflife, stating, "I 
have lived my whole life respecting the gods and acting morally towards men,,27. From 
this it can be clearly inferred that Xenophon's Socrates holds to the same ideal as that 
presented in Epictetus: that focusing on doing good alone, here represented by living a 
life in which one does no wrong, and further, acts morally towards gods and men. 
If the best defense Socrates, as presented by Xenophon, can muster and with 
which he sums up his life is that he is consistent about not acting wrongly and instead 
acts morally, clearly he holds Long's ideal, that it is worse to do wrong than to suffer 
wrong, to be a paramount principle. He further challenges Hermogenes to find anyone 
who has lived a better life than he, given that he has guided himself in this manner. If the 
best kind of life is the one Socrates describes as his own and also involves respecting 
providence, one can conclude that this is what Socrates sees as being a natural life for 
man, the focus of Epictetus' passage. Given the two accounts from Xenophon and Plato 
25 474c 
26 41 
27 42 
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respectively, it would seem that Xenophon's is the closer, especially as it is related to his 
trial, whereas the quote from Plato is not. 
Furthermore, Xenophon also writes: "Socrates: 'take the case of those who 
deceive their friends to their detriment ... which is the worse morally, to do it voluntarily 
or involuntarily?' Euthyd.: ' ... take that I say that voluntary is worse than involuntary 
deception,,,28. Deception of one's friends and in doing so harming them voluntarily is 
undoubtedly antithetical to Epicetus' claim that the nature of man is to cooperate and help 
his fellow man, and as harming one's friend involuntarily is deemed by Xenophon's 
Socrates morally wrong but only less so, he is in agreement with Epictetus that harming 
another is unnatural and morally wrong. Thus, again, where Long frames the passages he 
draws upon as being clearly drawn only from Plato, examining these passages as well as 
similar passages in Xenophon's writing cast doubt upon this premise. 
A closer examination of the cited passages in the Greek reveals a disparity 
between the passages from Plato and Epictetus and a parity between the passage from 
Epictetus and another passage from Xenophon. 
The key passage from Plato reads: 
Ti 8E 811; a'lcrxwv nOT€pOV TO 681K€IV ~ TO 681K€lcr8at; 6noKpivou. 
IIwJ...°S 
TO 681Kilv 
The key passage from Epictetus reads: 
28 Mem. 4.2 
[122] c.i.>auu't(oc;. OUKOUV Kui av8pco1toc;. 'tiC; 06v uu'tOu ~ CPU<HC;; 86.KV€tv Kui 
AUK'tis€tv Kui €ic; cpuAuK~v ~aAA.€tv Kui 01tOK€cpuAiS€tV; oU: oAA' €6 1tOt€lv 
auV€py€lV, E1t€Ux€a8ut. 'to't' 06v KUKWC; 1tpaO'<J€t, av 't€ 8sAnc; av 't€ !-til, (huv 
Oyvco!-tovn. 
'Q(H€ ~COKpaTllC; OUK E1tPU~€ KUKWC;; [123] - Ou, oAA' 01 OtKU<HUi Kui 01 
KU'tflyOPOt. - Ouo' Ev 'Pw!-tn 'EAouiOtoC;; - Ou, oAA' 6 01toK'tdvuc; uU'tov. -
IIwc; My€tC;; 
The language used by Socrates in the passage from Plato is markedly different 
from that in the passage by Epictetus. In the Plato passage, the notion is clearly one of 
commiting injustice or suffering it: 'to OOtK€lV ~ 'to 00tK€la8ut. In the Epictetus passage 
the emphasis is again on what is done right by nature, KU'tO CPU<HV, and further, stresses 
working together, auV€py€lV, and to pray for the well being of others, E1t€ux€a8at. The 
focus on nature is uniquely Stoic, doing injustice is not even discussed. I cannot agree 
that Epictetus' use of €6 1tOt€iv for to do well, and KUKWC; npaaa€t, for to do evil are 
perfectly opposite and perfectly symmetrical, respectively, to the use of 'to OOtK€lV ~ 'to 
00tK€ia8ut from the Plato. The former do have moral implications, but the latter are 
clearly meant to be used and understood in a technical sense in their relation to virtue. I 
would argue that it is implausible even an author working from memory would choose 
the former if they mean to adhere to inspiration from the latter. 
18 
Furthermore, ifthere is any Socratic source inspiring Epictetus' choice of words, 
it is far more likely to have been inspired by Xenophon's Memorabilia 3.5.16, where 
Pericles is decrying Socrates' implication that the Athenians do not work together. Here 
19 
we again see the use of the key term (JUV£PYclV. Although this is not the only term 
focused on in the Epictetus passage it is arguably thematically the most important. How 
does one do well, according to Epictetus? Precisely by working together and not harming 
others; he believes it is the nature of mankind to act in this way. 
[16] n6"C£ bE olhco n£i(Jovmt "COT~ apxoumv, oi' Kui 6YUAAOVmt Eni "C41 Kumq>povclv 
''I ' 29 lluAt<J"CU xmpoumv ; 
[16] When will they reach that standard of obedience to their rulers, seeing that 
they make contempt of rulers a point of honour? Or when will they attain that 
harmony, seeing that, instead of working together for the general good, they are 
more envious and bitter against one another than against the rest of the world, are 
the most quarrelsome of men in public and private assemblies, most often go to 
law with one another, and would rather make profit of one another so than by 
mutual service, and while regarding public affairs as alien to themselves, yet fight 
over them too, and find their chief enjoyment in having the means to carryon 
such strife?30 
29 Xenophon. Xenophontis opera omnia, vol. 2, 2nd edn. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1921 (repr. 1971). 
30 Xenophon. Xenophon in Seven Volumes, 4. E. C. Marchant. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; 
William Heinemann, Ltd., London. 1923. 
20 
[c.] The paradigm wrongdoer, the tyrant, has the least power and freedom. (466b-e; 
Epictetus 4.1.51-3) 
Long continues his argument using a passage from Epictetus which focuses 
primarily on happiness. Epictetus writes: 
'bray 06v /lirrs oi pumAET<; AEyO/lEVot ~WOlV w<; 8EAoum /li!8' oi <piAot'tWV 
pumAEcov, 'tiVE<; En Eiaiv EAEU8EPot; Zi!'tEt Kui EUpi!aEt<;. EXEt<; yap o<p0P/lO<; nupo 
't~<; <puaEco<; npo<; EupEatv 't~<; OA1l8Eiu<;. d ~' uU'to<; oux oTo<; 'tE El KU'tO 'tuura<; 
\lftAO<; nOpEUO/lEVO<; EUpEiV 'to E~~<;, OKouaov nupo 'tWv E~ll'tllKo'tcov. [52] 'ti 
AEyoUatv; oyu80v aot ~OKET ~ EAEU8Epiu; - To /lEyta'tov. - ~uvurat 06v n<; 'toO 
/lEyia'tOu oyu800 ruyxavcov KUKO~at/lOVETv A KUKW<; npaaaEtv; - oU. - 'baou<; 
06v av '{~n<; KUKO~at/lOVoOvra<;, ~uapooOv'tu<;, nEV800vra<;, ono<puivou 8uppwv 
/l~ ElVat EAEU8EpOU<;. - .A.no<puivo/lut. 
"Since, therefore, neither those who are called kings, nor the friends of kings live 
as they wish, who can be called free? Seek, and you will find; for you are 
furnished by nature with resources for discovering the truth. But if you are unable 
to discover for yourself what follows next by recourse to these resources alone, 
listen to those who have searched before you. What do they say? Do you consider 
freedom to be a good? 'the greatest' Can anyone then who attains this greatest 
good be unhappy or fare badly? 'No' Whoever, therefore, you see to be unhappy, 
woebegone, mournful, you should confidently declare not to be free. 'I do",3l. 
31 4.1.51-3 
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Long, misinterpreting the focus of Epictetus' passage, presents passages from 
Plato concerning primarily power as a close parallel to Epictetus' writings. In the 
passage by Plato which Long turns to, first, Socrates advances the claim that orators have 
the least power in the city. Then, Polus claims that they, in fact, have the most power, 
asking if it is not true that they have the power, as do tyrants, of putting people to death, 
confiscating their possessions, and exiling them. Plato's Socrates replies: "I say, Polus, 
that both orators and tyrants have the least power in their cities, as I was saying just now. 
For they do just about nothing they want to, though they certainly do whatever they see 
most fit to do,,32 Polus claims this is having great power and Socrates replies that Polus 
has claimed having power is good for its possessor, Socrates ventures, "Do you think it's 
good, then, if a person does whatever he sees most fit to do when he lacks intelligence? 
Do you call this 'having great power' too? Polus: No I do not,,33. 
32466d-e 
33466d_e 
The key passages terminologically Long references from the Gorgias are below: 
466c 
[466~] 'tl 08; OUX, WcrTU::p 01 WPUWOl, 01tOK't£tvuucrlv 't£ Ov av BouAWVmt, Kui 
[466c] 
Polus 
What? Are they not like the despots, in putting to death anyone they please, and 
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depriving anyone of his property and expelling him from their cities as they may 
think fit?34 
[4660] oi Pit'toPEs oUs av POUAffiVTal, WO"1tEP oi roPUWOl, Kui XPitIlU'tU 
o<pmpOUVTal Kui ESEAuuvoumv EK 'tWV 1tOAEffiV Ov av OOKn ulhols;" 
Socrates 
Were you not this moment saying something like this: Is it not the case that the 
orators put to death anyone they wish, like the despots, and deprive people of 
property and expel them from their cities as they may think fit? 
The key terms in the Epictetus passage are SSAoum and EAEUSEPOl, for wishing 
and freedom from. The key terms in the Plato passages are PouAffiv'tm and OOKn, for what 
one desires and what not what one wishes and what one considers best. Although in 
translation the meanings appear similar, the terms used do not match, thus casting doubt 
on any claims asserting direct inspiration. Furthermore, the terms used for rulers are 
different: Plato uses ropUWOl while Epictetus opts for pumAEls. In the cases of SSAoum 
and PouAffiv'tm, and ropUWOl and pumAEls, the meaning is largely the same, however I 
maintain it is important to note there is no absolutely direct paraphrasing occurring. The 
key difference is Epictetus' use ofEAEUSEPOl. Freedom is established to be the greatest 
good and intrinsically tied to one's happiness. The entire concept is noticeably lacking in 
the Plato passage, and thus one must conclude that this central concept was not inspired 
by Plato's Socrates. 
34 Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 3 translated by W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1967. 
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The Platonic argument centers around intelligence as the gauge of whether or not 
one acts for the good, whereas Epictetus uses happiness. Additionally, Plato's writing 
focuses much more heavily on the role of power, which Long draws into his argument, 
but which, is, in fact, not present in the passage by Epictetus. While Epictetus does 
reference kings, his focus is on happiness as it relates to freedom and not power. 
The implications of Socrates in the Gorgias passage is that those who have power 
have subconscious desires, presumably related to aspiring towards the good, that are not 
fulfilled, while at the same time they consciously do fulfill the desires they are aware of; 
this is how those in power do not act as they want but do act as they see fit. Real power 
here would be fulfilling subconscious desires for the good instead. In the Epictetus 
passage the power that kings and their associates wield is irrelevant, the question is about 
freedom. Freedom in the Stoic sense, and certainly for Epictetus, requires no power over 
external affairs. See, for example, the opening chapter of the Discourses, where Epictetus 
asserts: "the gods have placed this alone in our own power, the most excellent faculty of 
all which rules all the others, the power to deal rightly with our impressions, whilst all the 
others they have not placed in our power,,35. Ifkings and their friends are not free and 
happy, according to Epictetus, he means simply and only that they do not properly judge 
impressions; acting as one "truly" wants with regard to external affairs is beyond the 
scope of what is in one's own power. 
Xenophon's passage below presents a picture in which only those who understand 
virtue truly have choice, and the ability to choose what they want, and thus aim at the 
good. Therefore others, while appearing to have choice, or using Epictetus' term, 
freedom, in fact do possess choice, and instead are slaves to their passions, which must 
35 1.7 
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ultimately make them unhappy, as they are ignorant of what they truly desire: real and 
true goodness. Xenophon writes: "Just actions and any others proceeding from a 
virtuous motive were truly good; those who knew how to do them would choose to do 
nothing else, and those who did not understand them could not do them, and, if they tried 
to, failed,,36. The Greek term Xenophon uses, translated here as choose, is 1tposAtaSul, 
that is to choose deliberately, produce or prefer. Those who understand just actions prefer 
nothing else and will do nothing else. Epictetus' understanding of freedom is that it is our 
ability to deal correctly with impressions, in the Greek he states this power is: l'~v xp~O"lv 
l'~v 6ps~v 'taTC; <puv'taatmc;, or right (from 6pS~v) use of\employment of impressions. I 
venture that these two are much more closely linked than the Plato passage where the 
important terms are ~OUA.roV'tal and OOKrl, for wishing and how one considers. 
Furthermore, Xenophon also references "unquestionable good": "'It looks as if 
the most unquestionable good is happiness, Socrates.' 'Provided that it isn't composed of 
questionable goods Euthydemus. 'Why, what constituent of happiness could be 
questionable?' 'None- unless we include in it beauty or strength or wealth or fame or 
something else of that kind' ' ... wealth often causes ruin through self-indulgence or the 
covetousness of others; fame and political power often lead to great calamities",37. 
Socrates here is not rejecting happiness as the important gauge of goodness, but the 
common conception of it, which includes wealth and power- the things that Epictetus' 
kings and friends of kings possess most principally, and which keeps them from choosing 
the good and thus being free. From the first Epictetus passage, we know that for him 
freedom is the unquestionable good and the source of happiness, and from the second 
36 3.9 
37 4.2.32-38 
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Epictetus passage we know that freedom is our power to correctly judge impressions. 
Here Xenophon's Socrates affirms that happiness is the greatest good, as long as its' 
constituents are not things that Epictetus would assert we have no freedom concerning or 
power over: wealth, power and the like. 
[D.] Every action is motivated by a desire for the good. (468b; Epictetus 1.18.1-2; 
3.3.2-4) 
Long draws upon two passages in Epictetus that focus on desires and good actions 
when furthering his argument that Epictetus relied solely upon Plato as his source. 
Epictetus writes: "If what the philosophers say be true .... so also in the case of impulse 
towards a thing, the feeling that it conduces to my advantage, and that it is impossible to 
judge one thing to be advantageous and desire another, and to judge one thing appropriate 
and be impelled to the other,,38. The important focal point within this passage is the 
reference to impulses-Epictetus here focuses on the problematic nature of conflicts 
between what one may be impulsively driven to do and what one finds advantageous and 
appropriate. The second passage Long uses is: "Now as it is the nature of every soul to 
assent to what is true and dissent from what is false, and suspend judgment in matters of 
uncertainty, it must be its nature likewise to be moved by desire for what is good, 
aversion from what is evil, and a neutral disposition towards what is neither good nor 
evil.. . .Immediately the good appears, it draws the soul towards it and by evil the soul is 
repelled .... A soul will never reject a clear impression of the good" 39. Similarly, this 
passage suggests that human nature will draw humans towards good actions and away 
381.18.1_2 
39 3.3.2-4 
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from evil actions. The passage from Plato, which Long cites as a parallel, broadly 
addresses why humans act: "Now whenever people do things, do they do these 
intermediate things for the sake of the good ones, or the good things for the sake of the 
intermediate ones? Polus: The intermediate things for the sake of the good ones, 
surel/O." Socrates provides several examples, then concludes, "Hence it's for the sake of 
what's good that those who do all these things do them,,41. Plato's Socrates portrays 
motivation here in a complex manner, one not reflected in Epictetus' passages. He is 
asserting that when one acts, one already has a higher good in mind, and choice of 
intermediates is based on a desire for this higher good. Epictetus posits instead the 
existence ofthree kinds of things: good, neutral, and evil. The soul is always clearly 
drawn to choose the good, rejects the evil, and has no moral position with regard to the 
intermediate. Thus what is good is simply good for Epictetus and therefore choice 
worthy, whereas Plato's Socrates wants to allow for action towards something that is 
intermediately good. The two conceptions are different and those who respectively 
employ them will make choices in a different manner. 
Xenophon's writing, on the other hand, relies heavily upon the idea of self-
indulgence, which bears closer relation to how Epictetus frames actions and impulses: 
"So self-indulgent people endure the worst form of slavery? That is my opinion. Don't 
you think that self-indulgence debars people from wisdom, which is the greatest good, 
and drives them into the opposite state? Don't you think that, by dragging them off in 
pursuit of pleasure, it prevents them from studying and apprehending their real interests; 
and that it often confuses their perception of good and bad and makes them choose the 
40 468b 
41 468b 
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worse instead ofthe better? ,,42. Xenophon's references to the potential confusion 
between good and bad reflects also Epictetus' assertion that in the absence of impulse one 
will not experience conflicts between what is appropriate and advantageous and what one 
wishes to do. One's real interests from Xenophon's Socrates are the plain, clear, simple 
goods found in Epictetus. There is no complex schema involving intermediate goods as 
found in Plato. 
Let's return to the first Epictetus passage, where he claimed: "If what the 
philosophers say is true ... so also in the case of impulse towards a thing, the feeling that it 
conduces to my advantage, and that it is impossible to judge one thing to be 
advantageous and desire another, and to judge one thing appropriate and be impelled to 
the other,,43. I suggest a clear source of this is Xenophon's Socrates in the Memorabilia, 
when he states: "For I think that all men have a choice between various courses, and 
choose and follow the one which they think conduces most to their advantage,,44. Both 
passages explicitly assert that one chooses what one believes is conducive to advantage, 
which is a claim not found in the Plato passage. 
Examining the key passages in Greek again reveals differences between Plato and 
Epictetus: 
468b 
EVEK' opa TOU ayaSou 01taVTa taUta 1tOlOUOlV 01 1tOlOUVTEC;. 
Socrates 
So it is for the sake of the good that the doers of all these things do them? 
424.5.8 
431.18.1_2 
443.9.4 I chose the Marchant translation here: Xenophon. Xenophon in Seven Volumes, 4. E. C. Marchant. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; William Heinemann, Ltd., London. 1923. 
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It is eneka agathou, for the sake of the good, that one does everything one does; a 
very brief explanation on the part of Plato's Socrates which contrasts with Epictetus' 
assertions. A complex psychology of action is again what Plato appears to have in mind: 
it is not enough that something may be good in itself, but one must act with a mind 
towards a thing's help in attaining THE good. This psychology of action is not reflected 
in Epictetus: 
Epictetus 1.18.1-2 
'D'n ou aEi xaunaivElv Toi~ OflapTavoflEvOl<;. 
Ei 0/"'118s<; EO'n'tO UnO 'tWv qn/"'oO'ocprov A£yo~EVov On nOmv ov8pronot<; ~ia OPX~ 
Ka8anEp 'toU O'uYKam8s0'8at 'to na8i1v On unapXEl Kal 'toU ovavEuO'at 'to na8i1v 
On oUX unapXEl Kal v~ ~ia 'toU E1ttO'XETv 'to na8ETv On 0011/"'OV EO''ttv, oU'tro<; Kal 
'tOU Op~~O'at Eni [2] n 'tOna8ETv On E~OI 0'U~CPSPE1, o~itxavov 0' o/"'/"'o ~EV 
KpivEtv 'to O'u~cpspov, O/"'/"'ou 0' opsYE0'8at Kal o/"'/"'o ~EV KpivEtv Ka8~Kov, En' 
O/..,/..,o OE op~ov, 'ti En 'toT<; no/"'/"'oI<; xa/"'Enaivo~EV; 
If what philosophers say is true, that all men have one principle, as in the case of 
assent the persuasion that a thing is so, and in the case of dissent the persuasion 
that a thing is not so, and in the case of a suspense of judgment the persuasion that 
a thing is uncertain, so also in the case of a movement towards any thing the 
persuasion that a thing is for a man's advantage, and it is impossible to think that 
one thing is advantageous and to desire another, and to judge one thing to be 
proper and to move towards another, why then are we angry with the many? 
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None of the language here is similar to the Plato passage, instead we have 
judgment, krinein, of benefit, sumpheron, and there is no language related to doing things 
for the sake of the good but instead what one judges will benefit oneself. The motivation 
and psychology of action here is universal: every human judges whether their soul moves 
towards, perhaps better understood as approves of, beneficial things. Epictetus' language 
is controlled on this matter because he is a determinist; one has no actual influence over 
action itself. Each individual thing is considered this way, if Epictetus' intent was that 
one is drawn to THE good itself, and not the good of a particular thing, he would be 
sorely remiss in not stating so. 
Epictetus 3.3.2-4 
[2] n£qmKEv oE nOaa \jfUX~ wanEp "C41oA1l8d EmvEuElV, npoe; "Co \jfEUOOe; 
OvavEuElv, npoe; "Co aOllAOV En£XElv, oihwe; npoe; ~Ev "Co oya80v 0pEKUKWe; 
KlVEla8m 
and as it is the nature of every soul to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, 
and to remain in suspense as to that which is uncertain; so it is its nature to be 
moved towards the desire of the good 
Here Epictetus again differs, asserting the soul is moved toward desiring the good, 
"Co oya80v OpEKTtKWe; KtVEla8m, not claiming one acts for the sake of the good. One 
cannot act for the sake of the good because one has no control over external action. A 
Stoic human can only affirm judgments of good, this is where Stoic freedom lies, such as 
it is. 
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[E.] (as a corollary of D): No one does or wants what is bad, knowing or thinking 
that what he does or wants is bad [i.e. wrongdoing is involuntary]. (468d; Epictetus 
2.26.1-2) 
Long adds to his argument using a passage from Epictetus concerning acting in 
error, or doing wrong: "Every error implies a contradiction: for, since the man who errs 
does not wish to err, but to act rightly, it is evident that he is not doing what he wishes. 
For what does a thief wish to achieve? His own interest. If, then, thieving is against his 
interest, he is not doing what he wishes" 45. In this passage, Epictetus focuses on one's 
own interest again, as did Xenophon's Socrates in the passage quoted above (4.5.8), 
where he states that: "don't you think that, by dragging them off in pursuit of pleasure, it 
[self-indulgence] prevents them from studying and apprehending their real interests". 
Long identifies a passage from Plato as a parallel: "If a person who's a tyrant or an orator 
puts somebody to death or exiles him or confiscates his property because he supposes that 
doing so is better for himself when actually it's worse, this person, I take it, is doing what 
he sees fit, isn't he? Polus: Yes. Socrates: And is he also doing what he wants, if these 
things are actually bad? Why don't you answer? Polus: All right, I don't think he's doing 
what he wants" 46. 
Here Epictetus is consistent with earlier passages: the thiefs motivation is to act 
for his own interest, which is the natural goal of all. In the Plato, the claim is that the ruler 
is not doing what he wants because the actions are actually bad in themselves. It is this 
fact that makes it not what one wishes, whereas for Epictetus' thief it is simply that it 
turns out thieving is not beneficial. Deeper moral considerations are not a factor, despite 
45 2.26.1_2 
46468d 
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the rather misleading translation implying that one does not act "rightly" when they err. 
Epictetus actually writes: ou 8£AEt Oflap'tUVEtv, OAAO Kawp8wO"at, or the thief does not 
wish to fail, but succeed. 
[F.] (as a further corollary of D): The wrongdoer does not do what he wants, but 
what (mistakenly) 'seems good to him' (468; Epictetus 4.1.3) 
Long focuses on another passage in Epictetus that addresses the lives of "bad" 
men: "No bad man then, lives as he likes; and neither is he free" 47. He identifies the 
following passage from Plato as a close parallel: "So, what I was saying is true, when I 
said that it is possible for a man who does in his city what he sees fit not to have great 
power, nor to be doing what he wants" 48. Again, the passage that Long chooses focuses 
more squarely on power than on good and bad actions. Long cites the entirety of 468 as 
his inspiration for source F where, as we saw earlier, the key assertion is that one does 
things for the sake of the good, eneka agathou. The only noteworthy addition not yet 
discussed comes from the following line: 
47 4.1.3 
48 468 
468e 
OAYJ8~ opa £yw EAEYOV, MY(f)v On EO"nv Ov8p(f)1[oV 1[OlOUv'ta £v 1[OAEt a bOKEI 
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The idea here is that it is possible to do what one sees fit without having great 
power or doing what one wishes. Epictetus does use BOUAEmt for wish in the key passage 
here, however his overriding point is different: 
Epictetus 4.1.3 
[3] - OU()Et<;. - OU()Ei<; Cpa TWV cpauAffiv ~n W<; BouAEmt: oU TOivuv oU()' 
EAEU8EPO<; EaTtv. 
Not one then of the bad lives as he wishes; nor is he then free. 
None ofthe low, TWV cpauAffiv, live as they wish, and they lack freedom. Freedom 
for Epictetus is the power to judge impressions correctly, as was established earlier, 
living as one wishes is recognition and embodiment of this as well as regarding one's 
own interest chiefly, also established earlier. To live as one wishes here is ~n w<; 
BOUAETat, in Plato we have to do what one sees fit, 1totOuvm EV 1tOAEt a ()OKEI aUT4), and 
not to do what one wishes, 1totEiv a BouAEmt. Again, Plato is suggesting a more complex 
psychology of action, whereas Epictetus does not allow considerations of Plato's 
()Uvaa8at, power or ability, to be relevant at all. In the Plato, it is established that one 
does things again for the sake of the good, eneka agathou, and one can do what he sees 
fit, without having great power (mega dunasthai) or doing as he wishes (bouletai poiein) 
in Epictetus it is simply stated that none of the phaulol\n (low) lives as he wishes, or is 
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free (eleutheros). Xenophon's Socrates emphasizes that knowledge of what one wants to 
achieve is the key to living as one wishes, stating: 
"try to ensure as far as possible that you know about the things that you want to 
The focus for both Epictetus and Xenophon's Socrates is on knowledge 
concerning what is in one's interest or to one's benefit. 
[G.] Untended diseases of the soul leave ineradicable imprints. (S2Sa; Epictetus 
2.18.11)" 
Long's final passage which he parallels to Plato focuses on sickness of the mind: 
" ... and something similar happens in the sickness of the mind too. Certain traces and 
weals are left behind in it, which, unless the person concerned expunges them utterly, the 
next time he is flogged in the same place, not weals but wounds are created" 50. Long 
quotes Plato, who writes: "Rhadamanthus brings them to a halt and studies each person's 
soul without knowing whose it is. He's often gotten hold of the Great King, or some other 
king or potentate, and noticed that there's nothing sound in his soul but that it's been 
thoroughly whipped and covered with scars, the results of acts of perjury and of injustice, 
things that each of his actions has stamped upon his soul. Everything was warped as a 
result of deception and pretense, and nothing was straight, all because the soul had been 
nurtured without truth. And he saw that the soul was full of distortion and ugliness due to 
49 3.6.18 
50 2.18.11 
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license and luxury, arrogance and incontinence in its actions,,51. While this is an 
appropriate passage as it includes a description of the scarring that can occur to one's 
soul, it is not the only potential source material for Epictetus' passage. Specifically, 
Xenophon writes: "Or who could escape degradation both of body and of mind ifhe is a 
slave to his appetites? ... a man who is a slave to such pleasures ought to pray to the gods 
that he may find good masters; for that is the only way in which such a person may be 
saved" 52. In this case, both Xenophon and Epictetus are emphasizing the terrible state of 
the soul\mind. When Epictetus describes the "sickness of the mind" this can be seen as 
quite parallel to Xenophon's "degradation of ... mind". Thus, Epictetus' writing, again, 
while it may be related to the passages of Plato which Long has chosen, also bears 
striking resemblance to Xenophon's writing as well. 
Thus, Long proposes that each of these seven propositions can be traced back 
precisely and solely to Plato's writing alone. However, as has been ShOWfl, Xenophon's 
writings often present an equally similar, ifnot stronger parallel to Epictetus' text. 
Long's claim that Epictetus relied upon only Plato, then, appears to be narrow-minded, as 
Xenophon is as likely a candidate for Epictetus' source material. 
Closely examining the original Greek of the last of the seven points again shows 
key terminological differences between the work of Epictetus and Plato. Further, a 
similarity can be found between the work of Xenophon and Epictetus. 
51 525a 
52 1.5 
Gorgias 525a 
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€uSu 't~<; <ppoupo<;, oT ~EAA€t EASouaa OVa'tA~Vat 'to 1tpoai]Kov'ta miS'll. 
[525a] where every act has left its smirch upon his soul, where all is awry through 
falsehood and imposture, and nothing straight because of a nurture that knew not 
truth53 : or, as the result of an unbridled course of fastidiousness, insolence, and 
incontinence, he finds the soul full fraught with disproportion and ugliness. 
Beholding this he sends it away in dishonor straight to the place of custody, where 
on its arrival it is to endure the sufferings that are fitting 
Epictetus 2.18.11 
[11] 'towu't6v n Ka! E1t! 'tWv 't~<; "'UX~<; 1taS&v yiv€'t<lt. 'iXV'll nvc Ka! ~roAro1t€<; 
Something of the kind happens also in diseases of the soul. Certain traces and 
blisters are left in it, and unless a man shall completely efface them, when he is 
53 A more modem translation, employed by Cooper, is: "that each of his actions has stamped on his soul. 
Everything was warped as a result of deception and pretense, and nothing was straight, all because the soul 
had been nurtured without truth" 
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again lashed on the same places, the lash will produce not blisters (weals) but 
sores. 
Mem 1.5 
oAAa Jl~V E'( yE Jl1l0E OOUAOV OKPU't~ OE~UtJlE8' av, 1I:W<; OUK a~tov uU'tov yE 
cpuA<i~ua8ut 'tOtou'tOv ysvEa8at; Kui yap OUX, Wa1l:Ep oi 1I:AEOVEK'tat 'twv aAAcov 
OcpatPOUJlSVOl XP"Jlu'tu EUU'tOU<; oOKoum 1I:Aou'ti~Etv, olhco<; 6 OKPU't~<; 'toT<; JlEV 
aAAOl<; ~AU~EPO<;, EUU't41 0' WCPEAtJlO<;, oAAa KUKOUPY0<; JlEV 'tWv aAAcov, EUU'tOU 
OE 1I:OAU KUKOUpYO'tEP0<;, dYE KUKOUPY0'tU'tov Ean Jl~ JlOVOV 'toY OTKOV 'toY 
Euu'tOU cp8EiPEtv, OAAa Kui 'to aWJlu Kui 't~v 'l'uX,"v: 
[3] Surely then, if we should refuse a vicious slave, the master must look to it that 
he does not grow vicious himself? For whereas the covetous, by robbing other 
men of their goods, seem to enrich themselves, a vicious man reaps no advantage 
from the harm he does to others. If he is a worker of mischief to others, he brings 
much greater mischief on himself, if indeed the greatest mischief of all is to ruin 
not one's home merely, but the body and the soul. 
The phrase in Plato is: E~COJlOP~u'tO Ei<; 't~v 'l'uX,"v, or imprinted on the soul, 
whereas in Epictetus it is: 'l'uX,~<; 1I:u8wv yiVE'tUt. '(XVll nva Kui JlOOAC01l:E<; 01l:0AEt1l:0V'tUt, or 
in sufferings of the soul, some tracks or marks or bruises are left behind. The mental 
images evoked by all three passages are peculiar, however I think the one from Plato is 
quite different from the others. The imprint on the soul mentioned is meant to be a sign of 
a poor soul to the gods, whereas in the other two passages the notion is more pragmatic: 
these tracks or bruises become engrained in one's being, and help one further habituate 
poor judgment. In the Memorabilia, the idea is that when one acts wrongly one not only 
acts to trouble oneself but <p8EipEtv, to destroy, Kui TO crWJlU Kui T~V 'l'uXilv, both body 
and soul, and in Epictetus it is emphasized that once these marks are left, upon being 
revisited they become even worse than before. 
Socratic elenchus in the Discourses 
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Long continues his argument that Epictetus drew upon Plato as his primary source 
by suggesting that Epictetus imitates the Socratic elenchus found in Plato. Long explains: 
"Elenchus is Plato's name for Socrates' method of asking questions with a view to 
eliciting his interlocutors' opinions about a moral concept, examining their answers, and 
showing (typically) that they are radically confused and therefore do not know what they 
thought they knew" 54. Long goes on to present Epictetus as using elenchus in a few key 
passages: "[Epictetus' assumption is] crucial to our understanding of why he appropriated 
the Socratic elenchus. It may be stated as follows: human beings are innately equipped 
with the motivation to seek their own good, i.e. happiness, and to choose whatever means 
they think will promote that good. I will explain this assumption after we have observed 
his use of it in two elenctic passages." Long attempts to illustrate this using two 
examples, the first a passage discussing Euripides' Medea, and the second a conversation 
between Epictetus' and a politician who has fled his home in anguish over the illness of a 
child. Epictetus' point in these passages is to show that no one willingly chooses wrong, 
but instead misjudges. Long claims these passages are evidence of Epictetus using 
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Socratic elenchus, along the lines that he is exposing the errors of his conversant 
(although in the case of Medea there is no conversant). This highlights my central 
disagreement with his evaluation. While Epictetus certainly demonstrates throughout the 
Discourses that he encounters others and exposes their errors, he also at the same time 
provides insight into the correct ethical interpretation and instructs others on how they 
may learn to judge correctly. Ethical proscriptions and guided instruction on proper 
judgment are decidedly lacking in any of the "Socratic" Platonic dialogues, however it is 
my contention, as mentioned before, that they can certainly be found in Xenophon's 
Memorabilia. For instance, Xenophon describes Socrates as: " ... leading his audience on 
towards true goodness" 55. Further, Xenophon aims to demonstrate this throughout the 
Memorabilia, take, for example, his words introducing one such demonstration, where he 
writes: "let us also consider whether in discouraging his associates from [false] pretence 
he encouraged them to apply themselves to goodness; for he always said that there was 
no better road to distinction than that by which one could become good at the pursuit for 
which one wished to be distinguished. He used to demonstrate the truth of this statement 
in the following way ... ,,56. Plato's Socrates left his audience aware that their previous 
thinking was incorrect, but without guidance on how to reshape their thinking, whereas 
Xenophon's Socrates led his followers to "true goodness" through ethical proscriptions 
and suggestions on how to judge the world. Epictetus' acknowledged indebtedness to this 
approach is discussed later in this paper. For now, let us return to Long's argument 
concerning the two examples mentioned above. 
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Epictetus analyzes the story of Medea in a manner that does include the 
traditional question and answer style that Long identifies as Plato's Socrates method. 
Long focuses on the differences between Medea as portrayed in the play and Medea as 
portrayed by Epictetus, suggesting: "Medea presents herself as knowingly doing what is 
harmful (killing her children) under the influence of passion, but Epictetus, like Socrates, 
denies that such an analysis of one's own motivations can ever be correct; he takes 
Medea, notwithstanding what she says, to be motivated by completely mistaken beliefs 
concerning where her own advantage lies. The passage says nothing explicitly about 
Medea's error being due to her suffering from conflicting beliefs, that is the clear 
implication" 57. Long's focus here on the unique portrayal of Medea in Epictetus' writing 
does not wholly support his point, however. If one examines the original passage in 
Epictetus, it becomes clear that the structure is not precisely elenchus: '''The exact point 
is: she thinks that gratifying her passion and avenging herself on her husband are more 
advantageous than saving her children' 'Yes; but she is deceived. 'Show her clearly that 
she is deceived and she will not do it. But until you point this out to her, what can she 
follow except what appears to her [to be more advantageous]?",58. The question and 
answer structure bears some surface similarity to Socratic elenchus, however no exposing 
of ignorance is carried out, it is merely suggested as a correct course of action. 
Xenophon's Socrates is a teacher who actualizes the suggestion that one can show 
others they are judging incorrectly. One way in which he did this was by example, as 
Xenophon describes: "He [Socrates] disciplined both his mind and his body by a way of 
life which would enable any mortal human being who followed it to live with confidence 
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and security"s9. Thus, Xenophon described a Socrates who could be and was a model for 
his followers. 
The second passage taken up by Long to support his argument that Epictetus drew 
upon Plato's elenchus regards a father with a sick child. In this passage, Epictetus 
portrays a man whose sick child is near death and the man flees in distress. The man 
suggests that anyone in his position would do the same, however Epictetus counters that 
abandoning his daughter was not a reasonable act. The father, Epictetus argues, fled 
because of a mistaken belief that this was the correct thing to do. Long provides a 
shortened version of the lengthy passage and places in brackets interpretations of what he 
finds most Socratic about it. The content of the particular passage is not so important as 
his interpretations, which are as follows: 
1. "[The belief to be examined]" 
2. "[Pressure on the interlocutor to clarify his terms]" 
3. "[Confession of ignorance; inducement of aporia]" 
4. (text included here for clarification) "Accordingly, since our dispute is about 
things in accord with nature and what occurs correctly or incorrectly, what 
criterion do you want us to adopt? [Socratic style of analogical or inductive 
inference]. " 
5. [Further confession of ignorance and aporia] 
6. [Epictetus has the father agree that misjudgment about what is good and bad is the 
worst kind of harm] 
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7. "Now that you are aware of this, in future you will concentrate your mind on 
nothing else than learning the criterion of what accords with nature and using it in 
order to make judgments concerning particular cases,,60. 
While Long claims the above arguments are examples of Platonic elenchus, I disagree 
for a number of reasons. First, the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues most often ends the 
elenchus in aporia: he leaves his listeners aware that their previous thinking was 
incorrect, however they are not provided with a correct way to understand the scenario. 
However, in Epictetus' writings, like in Xenophon's, real conclusions are reached. For 
instance, Xenophon writes: "When the argument was referred back to first principles in 
this way, the truth became apparent to his opponents too. And when he himself was 
setting out a detailed argument, he used to proceed by such stages as were generally 
agreed, because he thought that was the infallible method of argument. Consequently, 
when he was talking, he used to win the agreement of his audience more than anyone else 
that I have known" 61 In this example from Xenophon, and more generally in his work, 
his Socrates proceeds from general preconceptions to conclusions. Plato's Socrates, 
however, does not arrive at true conclusions, as he instead exposes ignorance in his 
interlocutors and shows that they seem to have incorrect preconceptions. Epictetus' 
approach, which does lead to an understanding of the correct path, is best summarized in 
point 6 above: the father understands the precise nature of his misjudgment. This is quite 
similar to Xenophon's presentation of Socrates, as described here: "If anybody thinks, as 
some of the spoken and written accounts of him have held, that Socrates, though 
excellent at setting people on the road to goodness, was incapable of leading them to their 
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goal, I invite him to consider not only the way in which Socrates used to question and 
refute (by way of correction) those who thought they knew everything, but also the way 
in which he used to spend the whole day in conversation with the members of his circle; 
and then to decide whether Socrates was capable of making his companions better 
men,,62. In the story of the father and the ill child, Epictetus leads the man to his goal-
he helps him to understand the error in his action and to rectify the situation. This is 
reflective ofXenophon's Socrates, not Plato's, who would traditionally leave his 
followers uncertain of how to attain their goals and only certain that what they thought 
they knew was in fact incorrect. 
Additionally, returning to the passage about Medea from above, Epictetus 
suggests that if people are shown the error of their ways, they can recognize it. The 
ability of others to recognize their errors and improve from them is similar to how 
Xenophon describes Socrates' style: "On another occasion, Antiphon asked him how it 
was that he expected to make others politicians when he himself did not take part in 
politics .... Socrates retorted: 'Which would be the more effective way for me to take part 
in politics - by doing so alone, or by making it my business to see that as many persons 
as possible are capable of taking part in it?,,63 Epictetus' writings, particularly his 
suggestion that Medea can change through guidance is similar to Xenophon's 
representation of Socrates as desiring to aid people in becoming capable of taking part in 
politics. In both cases, the teacher is guiding the followers towards independence 
through a recognition that people can change and improve with instruction. As 
Xenophon writes: "It is obvious, I think, form the foregoing account, that Socrates used 
62 1.4.3 
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to reveal his opinions candidly to his companions. I shall now show that he also tried to 
ensure that they should be self-sufficient in their appropriate activities" 64. The guidance 
given to Medea and the father with the ill child both reflect this kind of Socrates: one 
who shares his opinions and provides instruction to his followers to lead them towards 
self-sufficiency. Finally, while for Plato, there is nothing good, helpful or instructive in 
the natural world Epictetus' suggests in the passage about the father and the sick child 
that learning what accords with nature (in a corporeal world) is the guide to making 
correct judgments. 
Long proceeds in his chapter to further elucidate his picture of what he considers 
to be Epictetus' methodology, stating: "his essential point is that everyone is innately 
equipped with a moral sense, or rather a shared stock of general concepts that furnish the 
basic capacity for making objective discriminations between good and bad, and so on. 
Because people naturally have this endowment they tend to think, like his interlocutor 
here, that they know the specifics of goodness and happiness, or right and wrong, and can 
therefore make correct value judgments in particular cases. When Epictetus draws 
attention to the 'conflicts' that arise from misapplication of the natural concepts, he is 
referring not only to disagreements between persons but also to conflicts or 
contradictions that arise for the same reason within the person, like Medea,,65. While 
Long frames this passage as being focused on methodology, in fact, this is not precisely 
accurate. Rather, he is, as I stated earlier, simply claiming it is possible to make others 
aware of errors in their judgment, and this is not distinctive enough by itself to be termed 
a methodological strategy employed by Plato's Socrates and Epictetus, excepting 
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Xenophon's Socrates from the picture. If Long was closely analyzing the methodology 
ofEpictetus' writing in this section, he could not draw the conclusion that Epictetus' 
methodology draws entirely upon Plato. While Epictetus does use the question and 
answer format, similar to Plato's Socrates, the details of the methodology are markedly 
different than the method Socrates uses in Platonic dialogues. This is precisely because 
Epictetus is providing advice on how one can learn to judge correctly, as was shown in 
the passage about Medea where Epictetus reveals that Medea could have recognized the 
errors in her thinking and in the passage about the father and the ill child as Epictetus 
shows that father coming to understand that fleeing was not a reasonable act. 
Continuing his explanation, Long states: "here Epictetus makes two big claims 
concerning people's innate concepts of value: first, any two people have the same 
preconception about the same item; or, to put it logically, they agree about the 
connotation of a term such as 'good'. Secondly, peoples' stock of preconceptions form a 
mutually consistent set of evaluative concepts or meanings. We may recall his comment 
in the preceding passage about 'starting from those [agreed] concepts,,66. Long explains 
that these preconceptions are common to all because of the very broad and sparse way in 
which they describe their particular content. I might agree with him on this but he doesn't 
make much of an attempt to back up his claim. 
When it comes to ethical preconceptions Long thinks his above claim is not so 
obviously correct. He mounts a defense on Epictetus' part to the effect that, again, in a 
very general way they have agreed upon positive and negative connotations. The problem 
is that these claims are rather content-less and do not explain how anyone, let alone 
everyone could generally agree about ethical terms in a meaningful way. If they did, and 
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if this was a marked feature of Plato's Socrates, the Socratic dialogues would not end 
with the participants in a state of aporia. 
Long proceeds to claim that for Epictetus, "his task, as he sees it, is to show how 
people's particular value judgments are typically at odds with their ethical 
preconceptions, and thus people fail to achieve the happiness and correct behavior they 
naturally want,,67. This claim is simply patently incorrect. The essential nature of ethical 
preconceptions, what made them have the property of universality, as both Long and 
Epictetus indicate, is their very broad and, as I claimed above, essentially content-less 
nature. Epictetus states, "preconceptions are common to all people, and one 
preconception does not conflict with one another .... For which of us does not take it that a 
good thing is advantageous and choiceworthy, and something to be sought and pursued in 
every circumstance?,,68. Long affirms this, writing, "what gives preconceptions their 
universality and mutual consistency is their extremely general content,,69. 
Long additionally focuses his argument on Epictetus' methodology, presenting it 
as similar to Plato's: "Both in Plato and in Epictetus elenctic discussion is a 
methodology that gets its participants to examine their beliefs by exposing unrecognized 
inconsistencies and involuntary ignorance. Plato's Socrates regularly asks his opinionated 
interlocutors to answer questions about 'what' some moral concept (piety or courage, for 
instance) 'is' with a view to subjecting their responses to elenctic examination,,7o. Long 
presents this idea of questioning and answering as the key component of Epictetus' style, 
as well: "Epictetus follows suit. He characterizes Socrates as a person who said that 'the 
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beginning of education' is the 'scrutiny of terms' (1.17.12), and in hyperbolical but 
authentically Socratic style he labels anyone who fails to know what basic values are as 
'going around deaf and blind, thinking he is someone when he is nothing' (2.24.19). 
More particularly, he connects the standard Socratic question, 'What is x?', with his own 
diagnosis of the way people typically err: by 'heedlessly applying their preconceptions to 
particular instances' (4.1.41; cf. 25),,71. He follows this with another quote in which 
Epictetus attributes wrongdoing to misapplication of preconceptions. Is this supposedly 
Socratic question ever really the focus in Epictetus' work? 
I instead want to claim that Epictetus' advice for how one can avoid falling into 
error and judging correctly bears a much stronger resemblance to the strong truth claims 
offered in Xenophon's Socratic writings. Furthermore, a more complete quote from 
1.17.12 in the Discourses, cited above by Long, shows that it is Xenophon's Socrates that 
Epictetus attributes the valuing of scrutiny of terms to: "And who is it, then, who wrote 
that the beginning of education is the examination of terms? Does not Socrates say that? 
Of whom, then, does Xenophon write, that he began with the examination of terms, to 
find what each of them signifies?"n. This explicit reference to Xenophon suggests 
strongly that Epictetus' relied upon Xenophon directly in his writing. 
Thus, Long appears to be selectively quoting from Epictetus to craft his argument. 
He continues in this same vein, analyzing Epictetus's writing in a limited manner: "I 
should also note that Epictetus does not imitate Socrates' use ofthe elenchus as an 
instrument for arriving at purely negative conclusions concerning the concept under 
investigation, as in such short Platonic dialogues as Euthyphro. However, the material I 
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have discussed in this chapter proves that Epictetus had an acute understanding of the 
positive methodology and goals of the Socratic elenchus. His main departure from it was 
in training his students to engage in dialogue with their individual selves and to use this 
as their principal instrument of moral progress',73. Regarding the former, Long has only 
discussed the Gorgias in depth, and does not demonstrate that Socratic elenchus as 
presented in Plato does in fact have a positive methodology. In fact, above I claimed that 
what he points to as methodology is not really methodology at all. I defined methodology 
as the means by which knowledge is imparted by a particular author to the audience. One 
could at best infer that his seven points from the Gorgias are meant to be demonstrative 
of positive conclusions, or perhaps positive methodology. While the former may be the 
case, I demonstrated above reasons to think that similar conclusions are present in 
Xenophon's Socratic picture, and that Xenophon's writings are in some cases even 
closer. What Long terms the positive methodology of Socratic elenchus does not lead to 
much at all in the way of positive conclusions, but rather merely exposes incorrect 
conclusions an interlocutor might hold. Where specific conclusions are reached, such as 
that Socrates should not flee prison but accept his punishment, are merely the result of an 
impasse in argument by those found lacking in knowledge, no knowledge that can be 
extrapolated more generally and applicably is produced. If positive inferences could be 
easily made from these works, one would expect ancient, medieval, and contemporary 
scholarship to be full of them, however in the early Socratic dialogues they are decidedly 
lacking. Instead what one finds are broad general claims about what Socrates or Plato 
(and which of the two is the correct one to attribute the claims to) held to be true. 
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Furthermore, Long seems committed to a picture in which one engages in 
dialogue with oneself, and asserts this is a tool for one's own moral improvement. He 
later uses the text 2.12.17-25 of the Discourses to back up this claim, although examining 
it leaves one quite puzzled as to why he does so. The text centers around Epictetus 
advising the necessity of approaching and attempting to assist even the wealthy and 
powerful in caring for their souls, despite the negative responses and reactions one might 
incur. What this has to do with self-improvement is entirely unclear and left unexplained. 
Long cites several examples from the Discourses where Epictetus varies his style to 
account for his audience, however Xenophon's Socrates is more likely to have been the 
inspiration than Plato's, as we do not see Plato's Socrates ever make an attempt to do 
anything of the sort. On the other hand, Xenophon writes that his Socrates, "was so 
helpful in every activity and in every way that anyone who considers the matter and 
estimates it fairly must see that nothing was more profitable than associating with 
Socrates and spending one's time with him in any place or circumstances." Even more 
relevant here is: "He did not approach everyone in the same way. Ifpeople thought that 
they were naturally talented and were scornful of instruction, he explained to them that 
the natures which are regarded as the best have the greatest need of training. He pointed 
out that the best-bred horses are spirited and impetuous, and that if they are broken in 
when they are quite young, they become more manageable and better than any others; but 
if they grow up unbroken, they are very difficult to control and worse than any 
others ... [more animal examples] ... in the same way, the best types of men, people with 
exceptional strength of mind and ability to carry through whatever they undertake, if they 
are educated and learn to do their duty, become excellent and most useful people, because 
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they perform a great many important services; but if they grow up uneducated and 
ignorant, they tum out worse and cause more harm than anybody .... [more examples]" 4.1 
Thus these examples from Xenophon serve to show it is likely Epictetus was imitating 
Socrates as described above when he sought to improve others and vary his approach 
according to his audience. 
Long concludes his chapter by stating: "Epictetus' greatness as a philosopher is 
his realization that the only ethical argument that can be suitable to human dignity is his 
argument that persons are shown how to apply to themselves, doing so not because they 
are told their duty by an authority but because they are presented with reasons they are 
competent to examine, test, and, if they find them cogent, internalize. Notwithstanding 
his Stoic identity, Epictetus drew the inspiration for his protreptic and proof from Plato's 
Socrates,,74. I have given many reasons above to doubt this claim; while Epictetus is 
obviously indebted to Plato's Socrates, I have demonstrated a heavy indebtedness to 
Xenophon's Socrates as well. Leaving Plato, and Long, behind I now wish to further my 
case by examining more close parallels between the work of Xenophon and Epictetus. 
Direct Referencing of Xenophon 
In the following pages, I will identify passages in Epictetus' writings which I feel 
clearly demonstrate influence from Xenophon's own writings. While these passages are 
often not precise parallels, they serve to illustrate that Epictetus was familiar with 
Xenophon's ideas and that he used those ideas in constructing his own arguments. At 
times, I will be able to conclude that Xenophon was clearly the sources of the idea that 
Epictetus is presenting. However, Epictetus did not simply draw directly from 
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Xenophon, or any of his sources, for that matter. Rather, he took inspiration from them 
and used their own ideas in developing his unique positions. Thus, not every parallel will 
reflect identical thinking on the part ofXenophon and Epictetus. More often, it appears 
that Epictetus drew upon Xenophon, but took the argument in a unique direction. What 
is key, though, is that Xenophon's influence can still be ascertained in the passages I will 
present. 
Thus far, I have addressed Long's suppositions that Epictetus drew solely on 
Plato as his source material by providing passages drawn from Xenophon's writings 
which are equally plausible sources of the ideas espoused by Epictetus. However, my 
argument is not simply that Xenophon could also have been a source for Epictetus, but 
rather, that Xenophon most certainly was an additional source of inspiration for 
Epictetus. In order to support this claim, in the following section, I will provide evidence 
that reveals that, at times, Epictetus relied so closely upon Xenophon's writings so as to 
actually quote him directly and that, much more frequently, Epictetus took guidance from 
Xenophon's Socratic writings in terms of thematic content for his own writing. 
I am not the first to identify Epictetus' reliance upon Xenophon as a source. 
Though not making the broad argument that I am that Epictetus did draw upon Xenophon 
as often or more so than he drew upon Plato, contemporary scholars have noted 
similarities between the texts. To begin, I tum to Jean-Baptiste Gourinat's article "Le 
Socrate D'Epictete". In his article, he notes a number of parallels between the two 
authors' writings. The first one is not a thematic parallel, but directly references 
Xenophon's work demonstrating Epictetus' familiarity with and valuing ofXenophon's 
portrayal of Socrates. Specifically, Epictetus writes: "Whereas it was the principal and 
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most peculiar characteristic of Socrates never to be provoked in a dispute, nor to come 
out with anything abusive or insolent, but to bear patiently with those who abused him, 
and to put an end to conflict. If you want to know how great his abilities were in this 
regard, read Xenophon's Symposium, and you will see how many disputes he ended,,75. 
Here, we see an instance in which rather than even paraphrase Xenophon, Epictetus held 
such high esteem for the way in which Xenophon represented Socrates that he instead 
directed his readers to tum directly to Xenophon's own writing. 
However, as Gourinat points out, this is not the only example ofEpictetus directly 
guiding his readers back to Xenophon. For instance, Epictetus writes: "See in 
Xenophon's Symposium, how many quarrels he ended; and, again, how he bore with 
Thrasymachus, with Polus, with Callicles; how with his wife; how with his son, when he 
was accused by him of using sophistical arguments,,76. The conversation with the son, as 
related in Xenophon's Memorabilia 2.2, and 2.3, contains another example of Socrates 
ending disputes, as Gourinat also cites. Thus we see clear evidence of an indebtedness to 
Xenophon in Epictetus' understanding of Socrates. While these few instances of direct 
referencing ofXenophon provide important evidence that Epictetus drew upon 
Xenophon, there are also numerous thematic connections between the works of each 
On Emotion 
The following passages, both focusing on envy, again demonstrate a strong 
influence of Xenophon on Epictetus, and again are also noted by Gourinat: 
Xenophon: "Considering the nature of envy, he concluded that it was a species of 
distress, but not the sort that arises over the misfortunes of friends or the good 
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fortune of enemies; he said that only those people were envious who were 
distressed at the success of their friends. When some people expressed surprise 
that anyone who cared for a person should be vexed at his success, he reminded 
them that many people are so disposed towards certain others that they cannot 
ignore their troubles, but go to their help when they are unfortunate, and yet are 
annoyed when they are fortunate. This, he said, could not indeed happen to a 
sensible person, but was the constant experience of the foolish,,77 
Epictetus: " 'Does an envious man rejoice in his envy?' - 'By no means. Rather, 
he is pained by it.' Thus he has moved his interlocutor by the contradiction. 
'Well, and do you think envy to be a feeling of pain at evils? Yet how can there 
be envy of evils?' And so he has made his interlocutor say that envy is a feeling 
of pain at good things. 'Does anyone envy things that are nothing to him?' - 'No, 
surely. '" Having thus drawn from his opponent a full and distinct conception, he 
then departed; and did not say, 'Define for me what envy is', and after the man 
had defined it, , You have defined it wrong, for the definition does not correspond 
to the thing defined ",78 . 
Epictetus argues that one can only possess envy concerning good things and not 
evil things, which are furthermore of significance and importance to the envier. This 
understanding is exactly in line with the argument ofXenophon's Socrates, presented 
above it, wherein he represents envy as being felt towards ones' friends and their 
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successes. Though Epictetus does not specify that one may also feel envy towards ones' 
friends, he does focus on the pain that envy causes to the one who is envious. While the 
simple feeling of envy may not pain one, this emotional response would be much more 
likely when the object of one's envy is a friend. 
The similarity between the two passages and the focus given to the topic itself suggests 
the influence ofXenophon's Socrates. 
On Material Possessions 
Both Xenophon and Epictetus, following Socrates' lead, advocate living a life of 
simplicity and limiting oneself to few possessions. Xenophon presents Socrates as: 
"most tolerant of cold and heat and hardships of all kinds; and finally he had so trained 
himselfto be moderate in his requirements that he was very easily satisfied with very few 
possessions .... He was certainly not foppish or ostentatious either in his clothing or in his 
footwear or in the rest of his daily life,,79. Xenophon also characterizes Socrates as one 
who: "disciplined both his mind and his body by a way oflife which would enable any 
mortal human being who followed it to live with confidence and security, and to have no 
difficulty in meeting his expenses"so. These passages bear striking resemblance to 
Epictetus' proclamations for how to live one's life. Specifically, Epictetus also focuses 
on giving up unnecessary possessions and living simply: "This is what you should 
practice from morning till evening, beginning with the meanest and frailest things, with 
an earthen vessel or a cup. Afterwards, proceed to a tunic, a dog a horse, a piece of land, 
and thence to yourself, your body and its parts, and your children, wife, brothers. Look 
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around you in every direction, and hurl these things away from you. Purify your 
judgments. See that nothing is attached to you or cleaves to you that is not your own and 
may give you pain when it is tom away. And say while you are training yourself day after 
day, as you do here, not that you are pursuing philosophy (to claim that title would surely 
be pretentious), but that you are providing for your emancipation. For this is true 
freedom" 81. Epictetus, following the examples set by Xenophon's Socrates, and also 
unquestionably Diogenes the Cynic, is emphasizing the importance of training oneself to 
live a life unencumbered by concern with material possessions, and goes further to extend 
this training not only to material possessions but even other human beings. To argue that 
it is only Xenophon's Socrates Epictetus draws on for inspiration would be incorrect; it 
would be similarly difficult to claim that he is inspired only by Diogenes. 
On Freedom 
Epictetus does not only espouse this parallel thinking to Xenophon's Socrates at 
one point. Rather, he returns to this ideal time and time again. He also presents 
Diogenes the Cynic as an example of this ascetic approach to life: "Diogenes was free. -
'How so?' Not because he was born of free parents, for he was not, but because he was 
free himself, because he had cast away all that gives slavery a hold on a person, so that 
there was no way that anybody could come up to him or seize hold of him to enslave him. 
Everything he had could be easily loosed, was loosely fastened. If you had seized hold of 
his property, he would have let it go rather than have followed you to recover it,,82. The 
suggestion that Diogenes would let go of his possessions rather than pursuing one who 
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had taken it suggests that he possesses true freedom: the freedom of a pure and simple 
life in which one holds that value is not to be attributed to one's possessions but one's 
character. The use of Diogenes in this passage provides direct evidence refuting Long's 
position that Plato's Socrates was the only influence for Epictetus. Ifhe drew here upon 
Diogenes, clearly Epictetus was framing his ideas based upon more than simply Plato's 
Socrates. 
On Self-Control 
We move now to examine the similar approaches used by Xenophon and 
Epictetus when discussing self-control explicitly. Xenophon writes: "If self-control is a 
truly good thing for a man to possess let us consider whether Socrates gave any impulse 
towards it by homilies of the following kind: .... and who would appreciate the company 
of such a person at a social function, if he saw him caring more about the food and wine 
than about his friends ... Surely every man ought to regard self-discipline as the 
foundation of moral goodness, and to cultivate in his character before anything else. 
Without it, who could either learn anything good or practice it to a degree worth 
mentioning?"s3 Xenophon's Socrates here emphasizes the importance of self-control, 
making the starting point for one's development rest in resisting indulgence in bodily 
pleasures. Similarly, Epictetus advocates training oneself to resist those same bodily 
pleasures: "Lay down from this moment a certain character and pattern of behavior for 
yourself, which you will preserve when you are alone and also when you are in 
company ... .In things relating to the body take just so much as bare need requires, that is 
to say, in things such as meat, drink, clothing, housing and household slaves. But cut out 
everything that is for show and luxury .... When you are going to meet with any one ... put 
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the question to yourself, 'What would Socrates or Zeno have done in this situation?', and 
you will not be at a loss to make a proper use of the occasion,,84. While Xenophon 
explicitly links the idea of self-discipline or control to good virtue, and Epictetus aims to 
present a more broad picture of a "certain character and pattern of behavior" it is clear 
that both writers value controlling one's excesses. Self-control is at the core of the pattern 
and character Epictetus urges one to develop, and he goes so far as to directly point to 
Socrates as an example from which one might establish this habit. 
While at times Epictetus directly references Xenophon, at other points, he 
provides examples which parallel those ofXenophon's Socrates. For instance, he says: 
"Remember that you must behave in life as you do at a symposium. Something is being 
passed round and comes to you: put out your hand take your share politely. It goes by: do 
not detain it. It has not yet come: do not stretch your desire out towards it, but wait till it 
comes to you,,85. Epictetus modifies Xenophon's example in the passage where Socrates 
criticized those focused too much on food and drink at events like banquets by providing 
a proscriptive about taking only your share politely. Additionally, Epictetus "used to say 
that there are two vices which are much more important and offensive than all the others: 
namely the inability to put up with things and to control oneself; that is when we do not 
put up with and bear things that we should bear, and when we do not keep away from 
those objects and pleasures which we should keep away from,,86. Here, he again draws 
on Xenophon's Socrates and influence when he critiques the "inability to control 
oneself." Thus the attention to training and self-discipline that is so characteristic and oft 
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discussed in Epictetus' work appears to have its basis in the example set by Xenophon's 
Socrates. 
On Training and Practice 
Xenophon spends a significant amount of time discussing the necessity of both 
training and practice of virtue. For instance, Xenophon's Socrates indicates that in order 
to maintain one's moral character and avoid a regress, one must regularly exercise and 
practice virtuous acts: "No doubt many professed philosophers would say that ajust man 
can never become unjust, nor a self-disciplined man a bully, just as one who has learned 
any other subject can never become ignorant of it. But this is not my view of the matter. 
It seems clear to me that just as those who do not exercise their bodies cannot carry out 
their physical duties, so those who do not exercise their characters cannot carry out their 
moral duties: they can neither do what they ought nor avoid what they ought to avoid. 
That is why fathers keep their sons ... away from bad men, because they believe that the 
company of good people is a training in virtue, while the company of bad men is the ruin 
of it" 87. Epictetus appears to have taken Socrates' advice here into consideration when he 
speaks of acting properly: "Never call yourself a philosopher, nor talk a great deal 
amongst laymen about philosophical principles, but do what follows from those 
principles. Thus, at a banquet, do not say how people ought to eat, but eat as one ought. 
For remember how Socrates had so completely set aside all ostentation that when people 
came to him wanting to be introduced by him to philosophers, he took them along and 
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introduced them, so well did he bear being overlooked"ss. These passages bear 
similarity, but are not identical: specifically, while Xenophon argues that living in this 
way is important to maintain one's moral character and virtue, Epictetus is more focused 
on following through with your principles and doing the right thing. Epictetus wants his 
followers to go beyond calling themselves philosophers, and rather act in the correct 
manner. While not identical, this is similar to Xenophon's encouragement to exercise 
your character. The important part of being the person you would like to be is in 
practicing and acting in the correct manner. Both Xenophon and Epictetus here are 
reacting against the environments in which they find themselves in which they are 
dissatisfied with those who profess to be devotees of philosophy, but occupy themselves 
with largely theoretical concerns and rhetorical flourish, rather than living their 
philosophy. Though it may not be that Epictetus drew only upon Xenophon in this 
passage, it is important to note that both writers seem focused on avoiding hypocrisy that 
they may see others around them practicing. The negative public image surrounding such 
hypocrisy helped condemn Socrates, and continued to plague philosophers for centuries 
afterwards, as Epictetus is keenly aware. 
Xenophon further develops his position on the importance of working to improve 
yourself. His Socrates instructs: "Critobulus: if you want to be thought good at anything, 
the shortest, safest, and most reputable way is to try to make yourself really good at it. If 
you consider the virtues that are recognized among human beings, you will find that they 
are all increased by study and practice"s9. Epictetus takes Xenophon's suggestion that 
you must try to make yourself good at what you wish to be good at and provides the 
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opposite vision: if you do not continue to practice and improve yourself, you will have 
difficulty exhibiting the traits you wish. This can best be seen in the following passage: 
"When you relax your attention for a while, do not fancy you will recover it whenever 
you please; but remember this, that because of your fault of today your affairs must 
necessarily be in a worse condition on future occasions .... Do you not perceive, that when 
you have let your mind stray, it is no longer in your power to call it back, either to 
propriety or self-respect or moderation? ... To what, then, must I attend? Why, in the first 
place, to those universal principles which you must always have at hand, so that you do 
not sleep, or get up, or drink, or eat, or approach other men without them: that no one is 
master of another's choice and it is in choice alone that good and evil lie. No one, 
therefore, has the power either to procure me good or to involve me in evil; but I alone 
have authority over myself with regard to these things,,9o. Here, when Epictetus writes 
of "relaxing your attention", he is taking to heart Xenophon's exhortation that one should 
regularly practice and maintain one's character and virtue. Where Xenophon on the one 
hand proscribes a course of action, Epictetus cautions against the harm caused by failing 
to heed to this advice. The idea that virtue requires training had by Epictetus' time 
become commonly accepted, however to trace its origin to anyone but Socrates I find 
implausible. That is to say, even if Epictetus' more direct inspiration was an earlier 
philosopher, I would argue that earlier philosopher was in tum influenced by the example 
of Socrates himself. 
There are times at which Epictetus is even more explicit in demonstrating his 
indebtedness to Xenophon's Socrates. For instance, Xenophon writes: "On another 
occasion he [Socrates] was asked whether courage was a matter of teaching or a natural 
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gift. 'I think,' he said, 'that just as one body is born with more strength than another for 
doing work, so one mind is naturally endowed with greater fortitude than another for 
facing danger .... But I think that every natural disposition can be developed in the 
direction of fortitude by instruction and application .... My personal experience is that 
similarly in all other cases people both differ in natural capacity and improve greatly by 
the help of application. From this it clearly follows that everyone, whether his natural 
ability is above or below the average, ought to study and exercise any qualities for which 
he wishes to earn recognition" 91. Epictetus, in a parallel manner, describes the 
importance of not simply learning, but practicing. The both encourage their listeners to 
strive for both "instruction and application." As Epictetus writes: "Each man is 
strengthened and preserved by actions that correspond to his nature .... For this reason 
philosophers exhort us not to be contented with mere learning, but to add practice also, 
and then training. For we have been long accustomed to do the opposite of what we 
should, and the opinions that we hold and apply are the opposite of the correct ones. If, 
therefore, we do not also adopt and apply the correct opinions, we shall be nothing more 
than interpreters of the judgments of others. For who amongst us is not already able to 
deliver a systematic discourse on what is good and evil? That some things are good, some 
evil, and others indifferent: the good are virtue, and whatever partakes of virtue; the evil, 
the contrary; and the indifferent, riches, health, and reputation,,92. In this passage, 
Epictetus' encouragement to not be content "with mere learning, but to add practice also, 
and then training" appears to be drawing heavily on the advice ofXenophon's Socrates; 
this passage also highlights a tension between Platonic doctrine and Stoic doctrine. While 
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Plato would explicitly exclude entire classes of people from being able to use their reason 
in conjunction with practice and training to lead moral lives on the basis of a natural 
inborn incapacity the Stoics, and one could fairly infer they take their lead from 
Xenophon's Socrates in the passage above, instead hold to the universal promise of 
improvement by means of training and practice. 
Finally, we also see Epictetus encourage others to act in the same way that 
Xenophon encourages. He imagines that one should say to himself: "I am inclined to 
pleasure, 1 will move to the opposite side of the deck to a greater extent than usual for the 
sake of training. I have an aversion to suffering. 1 will train and exercise my impressions 
to ensure that my aversion is withdrawn from everything ofthis kind. For who is the man 
under training? The man who practices not exercising his desire, and directing his 
aversion only to things that lie within the sphere of choice, and who practices the hardest 
the things most difficult to achieve .... After desire and aversion, the second area of study 
has to do with your impulse to act and not to act, so that they should be obedient to 
reason, and not be exercised at the wrong time, or in the wrong place, or wrongly in any 
other respect,,93. This example also reveals how deeply Epictetus has taken on 
Xenophon's Socrates' argument that practice and training are necessary. He provides his 
own examples here, guiding his listeners towards practicing even "the things most 
difficult to achieve." From both sources we see a continuous stressing of the importance 
of confronting those things that will cause one to stray from the path of virtue, starting 
first with a strongly ascetic approach to sensible and moving on to exercising reason to 
the utmost in all matters of judgment. 
On Friendship 
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A further area where Xenophon's thinking appears to be reflected in Epictetus' 
writing surrounds the approach which Xenophon's Socrates takes towards friendship and 
helping others. Specifically, Xenophon's Socrates will not, like Plato's Socrates of the 
early dialogues, simply expose the error of a friend or associate's current thinking, but 
rather will guide his friends and associates towards actual knowledge that can help them 
improve their lives. This same approach focused on the improvement of all who seek 
improvement can be found in Epictetus' work. For instance, Xenophon writes: "he 
believed that those of his associates who accepted the principles which he himself 
approved would be good friends all their life long to himself and one another,,94. He 
continues, writing: "Socrates was obviously a friend of the people and well disposed 
towards all mankind ... [and] shared his resources unhesitatingly with everyone .... But 
Socrates spent his life conferring the highest benefits at his own expense upon all who 
wanted them, for he never let his associates go without improving them,,95. Thus, 
Xenophon's Socrates advocates for improving others and showing others the principles 
by which he lived his life. He is further implicitly demonstrating solid claims to 
knowledge, which the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues does not. 
Similarly, Epictetus approaches interacting with those who may not life upright 
lives, saying: "why should we still be angry at the multitude? They are thieves and 
robbers. What do you mean by thieves and robbers? They have gone astray in matters of 
good and evil. Ought we, then, to be angry with them, or to pity them? Do but show them 
their error, and you will see how they will amend their faults,,96. By encouraging his 
followers to help others to amend their faults through showing them their errors, 
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Epictetus is following the lead ofXenophon's Socrates and demonstrating his own 
implicit claims to knowledge and understanding of virtue. Xenophon argues that the way 
to show others their faults is through following Socrates' model who "actually benefited 
his associates, partly by practical example and partly by his conversation,,97. This 
combination of modeling good action and guidance through conversation is the approach 
that Epictetus, who often directs his conversations with strongly proscriptive statements, 
takes. It is important to stress here that Epictetus is instructing his companions with 
regard to how they should treat others. They should act as if appeals to reason should 
convince any party; that Epictetus seriously regarded such an approach as always and 
everywhere successful is highly doubtful, and as a proper Stoic he would accept the 
outcome either way. The duty to attempt to appeal to reason remains, and Epictetus 
would stand on principle in such cases just as Socrates himself would and did. 
Both Xenophon and Epictetus see this approach to interacting with others as 
benefiting all around them. Specifically, Xenophon writes: "he [Socrates] obviously rid 
his associates of any wrong desires that they had and urged them to set their hearts on the 
finest and most splendid form of excellence, which makes both countries and estates well 
managed,,98. The focus here is on guiding one's associates towards good and noble 
lifestyles in order to benefit all, as Xenophon says, this makes "both countries and estates 
well managed." A similar line of thinking can be found in Epictetus' teachings. He says: 
"And, more generally, he [Zeus\providence] has so constituted the nature of the rational 
animal, that he is unable to attain any of his own goods unless he makes some 
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contribution to the common good,,99. Epictetus takes the idea of contributing to the 
common good and the importance of this type of pursuit even further, suggesting that not 
only is it the correct course of action, but providence has gifted all rational animals with 
the ability to do so. 
Both figures also suggest that sharing knowledge with those around you to benefit 
them is an important step in living a life surrounded by good friends. Xenophon presents 
his argument, saying: "if anyone, by imparting any edifying knowledge that he possesses, 
makes a friend of one whom he knows to be naturally gifted, we consider that he is 
behaving as a truly good citizen should behave .... As for myself, Antiphon, I take as 
much pleasure in good friends as other people take in a good horse or dog or bird - in 
fact, I take more,,100. The key idea here is that when you take the time to consider others' 
interests and guide them by "imparting" them with "edifying knowledge" you make good 
friends. Epictetus also discusses the importance of not putting your own interests first 
and instead recognizing that the interests of others, your friends included, are essential: 
"Whenever, therefore, anyone puts his interest in the same scale with sanctity, virtue, his 
country, parents, and friends, all these are safe; but if he puts his interest in one scale, and 
friends, and country, and family, and justice itself, in the other, these are all borne down 
by the weight of self-interest and are 10st"lol. When you put your own interests "in the 
same scale" as others, you are necessarily, going to help them in any way possible, or as 
Xenophon suggests, impart upon them as much knowledge as you can. Xenophon also 
writes that: "When his [Socrates'] friends had difficulties, if they were due to ignorance, 
he tried to remedy them by giving advice, and if to deficiency, by teaching them to help 
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one another as much as they could,,102. Here we see, once again, the importance of taking 
your friends' interests seriously-Xenophon suggests giving advice and teaching as the 
means through which one should do this. Thus, both scholars consider the gift of 
knowledge to be an essential one and see sharing knowledge and guiding others to be a 
central component to living a good life and one filled with friendships. 
Both Xenophon and Epictetus expand upon their notion of friendship more 
generally, arguing the significance of friendships in one's life. Xenophon describes 
Socrates' approach to friendship, writing: "I once heard Socrates expressing views about 
friendship which I thought would be extremely helpful to anyone in the acquisition and 
treatment of friends. He said that although he often heard it stated that a good and sure 
friend was the best of all possessions, he noticed that most people gave their attention to 
anything rather than the acquisition of friends ..... yet, if we compare a good friend with 
any other possession, it must be obvious that the friend is far superior .... A good friend 
sets himself to supply all his friend's deficiencies, whether of private property or of 
public service .... As the occasion demands, he shares expense, joins in actions, helps to 
persuade, or uses compulsion .... A friend is just as much a benefactor to a man as are the 
hands that work for him, the eyes that see for him, the ears that hear for him and the feet 
that carry him" 103 . Here, Xenophon describes how helpful friends can be to humanity. 
Similarly, Epictetus expresses the beneficial nature of friendship: "But show me 
that you are trustworthy, a man of honor, a man who can be relied on; show me that your 
judgments are those of a friend; show that your vessel is not leaky and you shall see that I 
will not wait for you to entrust your affairs to me but I will come and entreat you to hear 
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an account of mine. For who would not make use ofa good vessel? Who despises a 
benevolent and faithful adviser? Who will not gladly welcome somebody to share the 
burden of his difficulties, and, by sharing it, to make them lighter" 104. Thus, where in the 
passages, both writers recognize the importance of aiding your friends and helping them 
to improve themselves, here they both also recognize the opposite: that friends can also 
aid one to a great degree. As Xenophon suggests, the reciprocal nature of friendships is 
key to both: " 'Very well, then,' said Socrates, 'if the facts are as you say, it would be 
well for a man to examine himself and see what he really is worth to his friends, and try 
to be worth as much as possible to them"1OS. Epictetus has taken from the example of 
Xenophon's Socrates another crucial tenet of Stoicism: seeing the interests of others as 
equally important as one's own. Clearly, earlier Stoics are also a source of this view, and 
perhaps even more directly so than Socrates, but if one turns and questions whether the 
origin of such views was unique among the Stoics or began with Socrates, I would again 
claim the latter. 
Not only do both scholars suggest that friends are mutually beneficial, but they 
also suggest that one should take joy in friendship, and it is to follow the example of 
nature itself to do so, again valuing others interests centrally. Xenophon writes: "By 
nature human beings have certain tendencies towards friendliness. They need one 
another, they feel pity, they benefit from cooperation and, realizing this, they are grateful 
to one another .... Rivalry and passion also make for hostility; the desire to overreach is a 
cause of ill-feeling, and envy arouses hatred. Nevertheless, friendliness finds a way 
through all these obstacles and unites men who are truly good. Their moral goodness 
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makes them prefer to enjoy moderate possessions and avoid tribulation rather than gain 
absolute power by means of war, and enables them, when hungry and thirsty to share 
their food and drink ... It enables them not only to suppress greedy instincts and be content 
with a lawful share of wealth, but even to assist one another ... .It enables them to settle 
arguments not only without annoyance, but even to their mutual advantage, and to keep 
their tempers from rising ... .It rids them completely of envy, since they give their own 
goods into the possession of their friends, and regard their friends' property as their 
own"I06. One of the important features ofXenophon's passage is how essential proper 
management of emotion is, and how this contributes to one's devotion to others. 
Epictetus, following this line, also suggests the importance of expressing joy in 
the friends that you have: "and the world is full of friends, first the gods, then also men, 
who are by nature endeared to each other; and some must remain with one another and 
others depart, and we should rejoice in those who are with US"I07. Epictetus here exhorts 
his listeners to take caution to control one's emotions and take joy in the natural 
relationships of friendship amongst mankind, while not allowing emotion to harm one's 
character. 
Further, both Xenophon's Socrates and Epictetus stress the importance of 
cultivating friendship. Xenophon suggests that you should immerse yourself in the 
process of friendship making: "Don't lose heart, Critobulus, but try to make yourself a 
good man, and when you have succeeded, you can set about hunting for truly good 
people. Perhaps even I myself might be able to lend you a hand in the search on account 
of my experience in love. When I take a fancy to anyone, it's extraordinary how 
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completely I throw myself into getting them to reciprocate my friendship ... .! can see that 
you will feel the same need when you set your heart on making friends with people,,108. 
The key phrase here is "how completely I throw myself into" making friends. Similarly, 
Epictetus advocates complete engagement with the process of making friends. He says: 
"in his relationships with others, he will be wholly frank and open to one who is like 
himself, and to one who is unlike, he will be patient, mild, gentle and forgiving as to one 
who is ignorant or falling into error on matters of the highest importance; he will be harsh 
to nobody,,)09. The complete openness and gentle approach Epictetus advocates is driven 
by the search for the good in them, the same search Xenophon's Socrates emphasizes is a 
natural drive. A further example can be found in the approach Xenophon's Socrates takes 
to the eager but misguided Euthydemus. Xenophon relates: "Euthydemus decided that he 
would never become a person of any importance unless he associated with Socrates as 
much as possible; and from that time onwards, he never left him unless he was obliged to, 
and he even copied some of Socrates' practices. When Socrates realized that Euthydemus 
was in this frame of mind, he stopped teasing him and explained as simply and precisely 
as he could what he thought it was necessary for Euthydemus to know, and what lines of 
action were best for him to follow"llo. 
On Providence 
Reverence for providence and the gift of reason it has designated in humankind to 
cultivate and thrive are also central themes found in Xenophon and later echoed by 
Epictetus. Both see providence as something which is to be awed as well as figure which 
has given humanity those things which make humans unique. Xenophon writes: "Now, 
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God was not content with merely caring for the body; what is far more important, he also 
endowed man with mind in its highest form. What other animal, in the first place, has a 
mind that is aware of the existence of the gods, who have set in order the greatest beauty 
on the grandest scale? What kind of creature except man worships the gods? What mind 
is better able than man's to make provision against hunger or thirst, cold or heat, to relive 
disease or cultivate bodily strength or take pains to acquire knowledge, or to keep in 
memory all that it has heard or seen or learned? .... Do you suppose that the gods would 
have implanted in man the belief that they can do good and harm, if they were really 
unable to do so? Do you suppose that we men have been deceived all this time and never 
realized this fact?"!!!. Within this quote, a few primary themes can be drawn: 1) a great 
admiration for all things created by god, with the important distinction that humans fall 
above all these other things 2) a focus upon providence' gift of the human mind with its 
great capacity for survival as well as contemplation and 3) the freedom which providence 
has granted humans. 
There are parallels in Epictetus' words for each of these points. First, Epictetus 
also expresses a great admiration for all things in nature while recognizing the superiority 
of humanity. For instance, Epictetus lauds providence'S creation saying: "For everything 
that happens in the universe one can readily find reason to praise providence, if one has 
within oneself these two qualities, the ability to see each particular event in the context of 
the whole, and a sense of gratitude" !!2. Additionally, he places a greater weight on 
humans in particular, saying: "Well then: each of the animals is constituted by god for a 
purpose .... But god has introduced man into the world as a spectator of himself and of his 
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works; and not only as a spectator, but an interpreter ofthem .... He [man] ... ought to end 
where nature itself has fixed our end; and that is in contemplation and understanding and 
a way oflife in harmony with nature" 113. Thus, both writers appreciate all that 
providence has created and see in humanity the ideal form that was created. 
Additionally, Epictetus models Xenophon on the second point: that God has given 
man, in particular the great gift of the human mind. Epictetus says: "this constitution of 
our understanding, such that we are not simply impressed by sensations but choose 
among them, and add to them and subtract from them, and thus make combinations of 
them .. .is not even this sufficient to move certain people and dissuade them from leaving 
an artificer out of their scheme?114. Epictetus's referencing to not only being "impressed 
by sensations" but also able to "choose among them" is quite similar to Xenophon's 
question: "What mind is better able than man's to make provision against hunger or 
thirst, cold or heat, to relive disease or cultivate bodily strength or take pains to acquire 
knowledge, or to keep in memory all that it has heard or seen or learned?" In both cases, 
the philosophers recognize the important capacity of man to have free will in approaching 
his world. This idea comes through even more clearly in the conclusion ofXenophon's 
passage, where he writes: "Do you suppose that the gods would have implanted in man 
the belief that they can do good and harm, if they were really unable to do so?" This idea 
of being able to choose to do both good and harm is striking close to Epictetus' emphasis 
on freedom in human choice as part of providence's design. Epictetus says: "and yet god 
has not only granted us these faculties, which enable us to endure everything ... but, like a 
good king, and a true father, has given them to us free of all restraint, compulsion or 
113 Disc. 1.6.18-23 
114 Disc. 1.6.10-11 
71 
hindrance, and has put them under our complete control, not even reserving any power 
for himself to hinder or restrain them"lIs. Thus, both authors perceive God as a figure to 
be praised, particularly for granting humanity with the mental capacity and freedom to 
live complex lives. 
A further example related to providence that Gourinat identifies regards 
Xenophon's description of Socrates' reasoning about the conclusion of his trial and his 
death. Xenophon presents Socrates as saying: "I will not go out of my way for that 
[death by illness or old age], especially since the alternative, as I see it, is that I will 
benefit at the hands of both gods and men; and if revealing the opinion I have of myself 
annoys the jurors, then I will be choosing to die rather than to remain alive without 
freedom and beg, as an alternative to death, a vastly inferior life" 11 6. The key passage in 
Xenophon's text regards Socrates willful recognition that "revealing the opinion [he] has 
of [himself] annoys the jurors". In Epictetus's writings, we find the passage: "Be content 
not to make entreaties: do not state in addition that you will not make entreaties, unless it 
be a proper time to provoke the judges deliberately, as in the case of Socrates. But if you 
too are preparing a peroration of this kind, why rise to speak, why answer the summons? 
For if you wish to be crucified, wait and the cross will corne. But if reason determines 
that you should answer the summons and persuade the judge as best as you can, you must 
act accordingly, with due regard, however, to the maintenance of your true character" I 17. 
Here, Epictetus references Socrates' intentional provocation of the jurors or judges, 
which, as can be seen above, is drawn from Xenophon's representation of Socates. 
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Although the apologies of both Plato and Xenophon clearly paint a picture of 
Socrates deliberately provoking the jury, it is only Xenophon who explicitly focuses on 
this provocation, framing a much more complete discussion about this issue than did 
Plato. Similar to Xenophon, Epictetus engages with the idea of the provocation more 
thoroughly. I believe the close link here is Xenophon's Socrates emphasizing that 
revealing his opinion of himself is so important that in doing so he chooses death, and 
Epictetus emphasizes that even when one is guided by reason to argue their case, they 
must always keep in mind and maintain their true character. Thus, Epictetus appears to 
have focused on not only the provocation, but also this preservation of the representation 
of the self: both Epictetus and Xenophon argue for authentic presentation of oneself, even 
in the face of death, though it seems that Epictetus takes the idea of preservation of one's 
character even further than Xenophon. 
Continuing with an analysis of the Socrates presented at his trial, we can see, as 
Gourinat also notes, an instance where Epictetus, in presenting Socrates' words, quotes 
directly from Xenophon's Socrates. Specifically, let us return to the following passage, 
addressed above as part of Long's argument: "That is why Socrates, when somebody put 
him in mind to prepare himself for his trial, replied, 'Do you not think, that I have been 
preparing myself for this with my whole life?' By what kind of preparation? 'I have 
preserved what was in my own power.' What do you mean? 'I have done nothing unjust, 
either in public or in private life" 1 18. The parallel in Xenophon was mentioned earlier. It 
occurs in his Apology when Hermogenes and Socrates are discussing that Socrates has 
not prepared a defense. Xenophon relates that, "Socrates at first replied: 'Don't you think 
that my whole life has been a preparation for my defense?' 'How?' 'Because I have 
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consistently done no wrong, and this, I think, is the finest preparation for my defense'"1 19. 
This is a particularly insightful example, as it is clear that Epictetus was quoting from 
Xenophon, however, even when he draws directly upon Xenophon, he still provides his 
own unique approach. Specifically, he paraphrases the very end of Socrates' quote, 
saying instead "I had done nothing unjust, either in public or private life." Epictetus' 
tendency to do just this, rely heavily upon a text, such as those by Xenophon, but to 
incorporate his own paraphrasing as well suggests the complexity of the relationship 
between Epictetus and his sources and the challenges associated with identifying 
passages as parallel. While there are some examples where Epictetus does directly quote 
from Xenophon, far more commonly, he uses Xenophon as inspiration or guidance more 
broadly. 
Epictetus does not solely draw on Xenophon when referencing the trial, as 
Gourinat also notes. Of particular interest is the focus and importance of divination for 
both Xenophon and Epictetus. Xenophon's Socrates suggests consulting a diviner when 
uncertain about actions: "Besides, towards his intimate friends he adopted the following 
line: if an action was unavoidable, he advised them to carry it out as they thought best, 
but where the result of an action was uncertain, he sent them to consult a diviner to see if 
the action should be taken" 120. Likewise, in Epictetus' writings, there appears a 
recommendation to "consult a diviner": "Resort to divination, as Socrates thought right, 
in cases of which the whole inquiry turns upon the outcome, and in which no 
opportunities are afforded by reason, or any other art, to discover what lies before 
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one"121. The representation of Socrates as believing in the usefulness of divination is 
unique to Xenophon, and yet Epictetus also includes a Socrates who would advocate the 
use of a diviner. Thus, Epictetus must be heavily influenced here by the Socrates of 
Xenophon, in particular. 
On Death 
The source of Epictetus's stance on rational suicide is undoubtedly Socrates, the 
two share thinking about the end oflife and more specifically the decision to end one's 
life. Xenophon's Socrates relates, "For I believe that the best life is lived by those who 
take the best care to make themselves as good as possible, and the pleasantest life by 
those who are most conscious that they are becoming better. Up to the present time I have 
felt that this was happening to me ... But if I go on living, I shall probably have to pay the 
penalties of old age: my vision, hearing and intelligence will become impaired; I shall 
become in consequence slower to learn and more forgetful, and inferior to those to whom 
I used to be superior. Now, even if one were unconscious of this, life would not be worth 
living; and when one is conscious of it, surely it must make one's life worse and more 
disagreeable,,122. In this passage, Xenophon focuses on a few key ideas: 1) that as one 
ages, the body and the mind weaken, unable to aid one in living the best life possible any 
longer, 2) at the point when the body and mind do slow down, it is better to die than 
continue to live and 3) that awareness of this slowing, in particular makes life no longer 
worth living. His suggestion that life may not be worth living subtly advocates for the 
acceptability, at times, of suicide, and idea which Plato's Socrates would reject. 
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In Epictetus' writing are references which seem to have been heavily influenced 
by Xenophon's Socrates' thinking about aging, suicide and the end oflife. For instance, 
Epictetus says: "It is more necessary for the soul to be cured than the body; for it is better 
to die than to live badly"l23. Epictetus believes that the soul being ill is equivalent to 
living badly. He additionally suggests that dying is better than living badly. This echoes 
closely Xenophon's Socrates' idea of choosing not to live when the body and mind age 
and are no longer effective. Additionally, Epictetus says: "If you send me to a place 
where I cannot live in accordance with nature, I shall depart from this life,,124. The not 
living in "accordance with nature" can be a consequence ofXenophon's Socrates 
description ofthe "penalties of old age." While Epictetus suggests that one can be sent to 
a place, place here should be understood more as a mental state than a physical state, as 
Epictetus tirelessly emphasizes that one's physical state is irrelevant. 
More specifically, both writers use similar metaphors to describe the relationship 
between a leader and the individual. Xenophon suggests: "on board ship the passengers 
pay most attention to the man they regard as the most experienced sailor,,125. The 
description of turning your attention fully to the "most experienced sailor" is reflected in 
Epictetus' words. Epictetus says: "When you are on a voyage, and the ship is at anchor, 
if you go ashore to get water you may pick up some small shellfish or vegetable on your 
way, but your thoughts should be fixed on the ship, and you should look back constantly 
in case the captain should call; and, if he calls, you must cast all these things aside, if you 
want to avoid being thrown into the vessel with yours legs bound like the sheep. This is 
the case in life also: if, instead of a vegetable or a shellfish, a wife or a child is granted 
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you, this need not hinder you; but if the captain calls, leave all these things and run to the 
ship without even looking back. And if you are old, never wander from the ship, so that 
when the call comes, you will not be left behind" 126. Epictetus extends the metaphor, 
suggesting that one must be ready to listen to the call of the captain, if you have been 
granted prized things upon shore. 
Finally, Epictetus' metaphor harkens back to Xenophon's description of being 
ready for death as you age ( quoted above). Epictetus suggests that as you age, you 
should stay close to the ship so that you can be ready when the captain calls. In the 
words of both Xenophon and Epictetus can be seen similar ideas about life, death and the 
failings of the body and mind. As Epictetus' says: "Our body, then, is not our own but 
subject to everything stronger than itself' 127. Both writers, then, see that we do not 
always have control over what happens to us, but, both also argue that one must be 
responsible for taking what control one can. 
Xenophon's Socrates takes special care to emphasize that lack of self-control and 
discipline is not only bad for one's moral progress but is in fact so bad that it makes one 
little more than a slave to one's desires; Epictetus makes the exact point himself in the 
Discourses. Xenophon's Socrates expressed the argument thusly: '''do you think that 
liberty is a fine and splendid possession both for an individual and for a state?' 'Yes, 
beyond the slightest shadow of a doubt' 'If a man is governed by the pleasures of the 
body and because of them cannot act as is best, do you think that he is a free man?' 'Far 
from it' 'Presumably you say that because you think it is the mark of a free man to act in 
the best way; and consequently to have masters who you from so acting is slavish' 
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'Absolutely' 'So it seems to you that those who have no self-discipline are absolutely 
slavish' 'It does indeed, naturally' .... And what sort of masters do you think those are 
who prevent the best actions and compel the worst?' 'Surely the worst possible' 'And 
what do you consider to be the worst form of slavery' 'I think it is slavery under the 
worst masters' 'So self-indulgent people endure the worst form of slavery?' 'That is my 
opinion' 'Don't you think self-indulgence debars people from wisdom, which is the 
greatest good?' 128. 
Self-indulgence here is emphasized is the key thing one must conquer in order to pursue 
wisdom, the ultimate goal Socrates believes all should seek. 
Epictetus expresses the same doctrine in a warning and instructive manner. He 
states: "For he that can be subjected by man must, long before, let himself be subjected 
by things. He, therefore, whom neither pleasure nor pain, nor fame nor riches, can get the 
better of, and who is able, whenever he thinks fit, to spit his whole body into his 
tormentor's face and depart from life, whose slave can he ever be? To whom is he 
subject?,,129. Epictetus expresses that physical slavery here begins with one's slavery to 
one's own body, and is not solely defined by being enslaved by another. Freedom is to be 
found, despite enslavement by another, in denying oneself indulgence. This key doctrine 
of Epictetus clearly has a strong root in the words ofXenophon's Socrates. 
Conclusion 
While Long would purport that Epictetus was influenced only by Plato's Socrates 
in crafting his philosophy, it is much more likely that Epictetus drew from a range of 
sources available to him, relying particularly on earlier Stoics, and using these sources to 
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ultimately frame his unique perspective. Within a striking number of passages, however, 
Epictetus seems to have drawn upon Xenophon's Socrates, be it directly or passed down 
through the formative role Xenophon's Socrates played upon earlier Stoics. Within this 
paper, I have first worked to systematically review Long's assertions that key passages in 
Epictetus' writings are most certainly drawn directly from Plato's writings. I have 
introduced reason to doubt these claims by providing evidence to suggest that similar 
ideas are also present in Xenophon's writings, and supported this counter-argument with 
evidence from the original texts. 
In the second half of this paper, I have identified passages where Epictetus' 
choice of thematic material echoes that ofXenophon's. While there are occasional direct 
parallels, suggesting that the only sources that Epictetus drew upon for certain passages 
was Xenophon, more often, there are significant similarities which do not rise to the level 
of exact parallels. For these passages, I would suggest that Xenophon was likely an 
influence, however, he may not have been the only influence. Additionally, it is 
important to remember that Epictetus did not simply quote from his influences, but 
rather, he drew upon them, taking their ideas and melding them with his own unique 
arguments. This leaves us with a complex challenge. In many cases the influence of 
Xenophon's Socrates is hinted at, but because of Epictetus' tendency to adjust or modify 
the ideas which influenced him and because of his likely wide range of sources, I cannot 
definitively conclude that Xenophon was the sole influence of many of these passages. 
Such an argument, that Xenophon was Epictetus' sole influence in many passages, would 
be as troubling as Long's assertion that Plato's Socrates was the prime source. Rather, as 
with most philosophers, Epictetus clearly drew upon the many voices, and texts around 
him, shaping his own ideas through a patchwork of influences. What this paper argues, 
then is that we need to see Xenophon's Socrates as a key component of this patchwork, 
who provided Epictetus with paramount inspiration and guidance. 
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